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ensure all support providers, either organic or contractor, have mission readiness, 
translated into warfighter capability, as their long-term overarching priority.    To this 
end, the business community (financial management and contracting) must develop a 
strategy that complements and satisfies the warfighters objective(s).  The purpose of this 
research project was to examine critical sustainment program characteristics from a 
business community perspective for applicability in future weapon system sustainment 
efforts.  The characteristics were identified to fall within three broad categories: (1) 
Reporting Mechanisms (developing and controlling the requirement); (2) Financial 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A.  BACKGROUND  
 
All weapon systems pass through a series of acquisition phases as they progress 
from an initial concept development phase to that of an operationally fielded system 
requiring long-term sustainment (Figure 1).  One aspect of the long-term sustainment that 
a System Program Office (SPO) must contend with during the initial fielding of the 
system and going into the long-term sustainment phase is how to manage and integrate all 
the different components that come together to sustain the weapon system.  Many 
decisions must be made during the early stages of the acquisition process that will have 
long-term affordability, reliability and maintainability implications throughout the life of 
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Figure 1. The Defense Acquisition Management Framework. 
 
In general terms, the Department of Defense (DoD) defines the Operation and 
Support phase for a weapon system as follows:1  
The objective of this activity is the execution of a support program 
that meets operational support performance requirements and sustains the 
system in the most cost-effective manner over its total life cycle. When the 
system has reached the end of its useful life, it shall be disposed of in an 
                                                 
1 Department of Defense Instruction 5000.2. Operation of the Defense Acquisition System. 2003. 
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appropriate manner. Operations and Support has two major efforts: 
Sustainment and Disposal. 
 
In the Operation and Support phase of the weapon system life cycle, DODI 
5000.2 points out the “purpose of the Sustainment effort is to execute the support 
program to meet operational support performance requirements and sustain the system in 
the most cost effective manner over its life cycle. Sustainment includes supply, 
maintenance, transportation, sustaining engineering, data management, Configuration 
Management (CM), manpower, personnel, and training”2.  This phase overlaps and 
follows the Production and Deployment phase which includes Full Rate Production 
(FRP).   According to CJCSI 3170.01C, the ultimate objective of the Operation and 
Support phase is to provide the personnel, logistic and other support needed to deliver 
prolonged combat operations to meet national objectives. 
As a program transitions from the Production and Deployment Phase to the 
Operation and Support Phase, the system program office must develop the best long-term 
sustainment strategy to use, which means having to make trade-off decisions on the most 
cost effective support approach, changing the approach as necessary to fit the political 
and economic climate at the time.  With assistance from the end user and supporting 
commands, the program office makes enterprise-wide programmatic and planning 
decisions on maintenance and repair workloads for all subsystems and major components 
and on the best way forward in managing the supply chain.  Stemming from the 
enterprise-wide sustainment strategy will be a host of functional level processes that will 
support and implement the overarching strategy.   
B. PURPOSE 
 
As any program passes through initial operating capability to full sustainment, 
transitioning into the last major, and arguably most costly, stage of the weapon system 
life cycle, many functional level processes will take place to ensure the sustainment 
program is realistic and affordable, and delivers the desired output.  The objective of this 
research project is to examine critical sustainment program characteristics from a 
                                                 
2 Defense Acquisition University Online Glossary, http://akss.dau.mil/jsp/Glossary.jsp Nov. 2005. 
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business community perspective for applicability in future weapon system sustainment 
efforts.  For this research effort, the business community is defined as the financial 
management and contracting functional communities.  The primary purpose of the 
research project is to identify the critical business community processes that are 
necessary to ensure successful implementation of a long-term sustainment strategy.   
C.  SCOPE AND ORGANIZATION 
 
Sustainment of a major weapon system is a broad and complex effort, dealing 
with multi-million dollar deals and a myriad of contractor and organic support providers.  
For this research project, the team members will examine, using a sustainment-focused 
business model, the business strategies used by the F-16 and C-17 weapon systems in 
sustaining their particular platforms.  The scope of this research project is to provide an 
examination of critical business community success factors.  In this report, the team will 
provide an informed foundation (literature review) on factors critical to the business 
community in support of a long-term sustainment program for a major weapon system.  
From the concepts identified in the literature review research, the project team will 
generate a business model for determining the best business-related factors to consider 
for a long-term sustainment strategy.  This business model will be used to analyze the 
approach two major weapons systems have taken towards long-term sustainment of their 
respective weapon system platforms. The two major weapon systems are broken down 
into a mature system (the F-16 Falcon) and a more recently fielded weapon system (the 
C-17 Globemaster).  The two weapon systems were chosen to contrast the different 
sustainment approaches taken by a mature versus an emergent weapon system. 
The literature review will center on three areas that the project team has deemed 
critical for a business community approach to long-term sustainment strategy.  The three 
areas are based on a similar approach taken in a recent RAND study 3 that considers 
critical success factors for any weapon system.  The three critical areas for this project 
are: 
                                                 
3 Johnson, Robert V. and Birkler, John.  Three Programs and Ten Criteria.  RAND, 1996. 
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(1) Reporting Mechanisms--developing the requirement and controlling the 
process 
(2) Financial Management Perspective--understanding the funding process 
(3) Contracting Perspective--arranging for the requirement/capability 
 
These three areas will not only serve as a basis for the literature review, but also 
provide a framework for building the business model.  The goal is to identify the 
relationships between key business community sustainment characteristics that are 
necessary for successful implementation of a long-term sustainment strategy.  The 
business model will then be used in a case study of the two major weapon systems to 
provide a descriptive analysis of each program’s approach to sustainment from a business 
community perspective.  Using the model, the team will identify, discuss and classify 
similarities and differences between the three selected weapon systems for their particular 
stage in the sustainment process.  The team will analyze areas considered as good 
practices, and provide lessons learned for areas that may need further management 
attention.  The project will conclude by providing a recommendation on business 
community strategies for long-term sustainment.   
D. METHODOLOGY AND RESEARCH PROCEDURES 
 
The graduate project team will use traditional research method and procedures to 
gather data related to the topic.  In providing an informed foundation on the different 
business community sustainment criteria, the team members will gather data from trade 
journals, on-line media sources and directly from source documents from different SPOs.  
 For the descriptive analysis of the two selected weapon systems, the research 
team will obtain and analyze source documents from the respective System Program 
Offices (SPOs), and as necessary, conduct informal interviews with key personnel from 
each SPO.  
 5
II.  LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. DEALING WITH FISCAL ENVIRONMENT CONSTRAINTS 
 
Before proceeding with the specifics of the business community approach in the 
sustainment phase, it is helpful to first start with a macroeconomic snapshot of the 
Federal fiscal environment (Figure 2).  As anyone who works in the current fiscal 
environment knows, whether it is in the DoD or other Federal agency, it is economically 
infeasible for Congress to fund all the requirement requests from all the different Federal 
departments and agencies.  The Federal tax revenue cannot sustain all requirements and 
growing the Federal Debt to fully fund them is not the answer.  To make matters worse, 
as baby boomers reach the Social Security retirement age and as Medicare costs 
skyrocket, spending for mandatory (statutory) requirements will continue to increase over 
the coming years, and will compete against discretionary funds used by other 
governmental agencies, the DoD being one primary user of this type of funding source. 
 
 
 Figure 2. Federal Spending by Category. 
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This strained fiscal environment will have drastic implications for DoD and the 
USAF.  It sends a signal that in the coming years the department must be more efficient 
and effective in spending and controlling its allocated discretionary funds.  When it 
comes to operations and support, it means the end-users (the warfighters) will have to 
rely on the government business community to aid them in making difficult trade-off 
decisions, where they will have to look at balancing readiness against the available 
resources, in the process making difficult prioritization decisions on sustainment 
requirements.  The government business community has provided this kind of support all 
along, but the business approach will take on a new twist as the fiscal environment 
becomes more strained and competitive.  The government business community will need 
to take a more proactive approach to doing business to ensure the outputs are providing 
relevant, accurate and timely information and tools to the decision maker(s).   
Exacerbating matters for the USAF are the aging of the aircraft fleet with an 
average fleet age of nearly 24 years, the cost growth attributed to state-of-the-art 
replacement weapon systems that are costing exponentially more than legacy systems to 
manufacture and maintain, and the dramatic increase in the operations tempo (Figure 3).   
 
41 years 41 years 21 years




all Air Force 
Airframes




Source: Deputy Director for Resources & Requirements Force Structure, Resources, and Assessment Directorate (J-8) Brief to NPS  
Figure 3. Average Age of Aircraft Increasing. 
 
While the replacement systems are driving up costs in the Research, 
Development, Test and Evaluation (RDT&E) and Procurement appropriations, the aging 
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fleet, more complex systems and the high operations tempo are driving up costs in the 
Operation and Maintenance (O&M) appropriation.  The aging platforms will require 
more maintenance and repair to keep the systems at a mission capable and availability 
rate that will meet operational readiness requirements.  As systems become more 
complex, it is becoming more costly to maintain and support them, especially for those 
weapon systems that treated sustainment as a secondary design consideration.  In 
summary, these factors are throwing the USAF into an escalating O&M cost spiral 
(Figure 4).  So what should be done to fix the problem? 
 
Growing O&M Requirement Will Be 
Aggravated By Aging of Weapon Systems
Aging, overused, obsolete equipment is 













Source: Deputy Director for Resources & Requirements Force Structure, Resources, and Assessment Directorate (J-8) Brief to NPS  
Figure 4. Growing Operations and Maintenance Requirement. 
 
The USAF has responded to the threat to its discretionary funding by 
transforming business processes.  One response has been to improve the acquisition 
process by using the concept of spiral development to speed up the development, 
procurement and fielding of weapon systems.  A second response has been to align the 
acquisition system centers under a wing-like organizational construct to improve lines of 
authority and control for similar weapon systems, and to incorporate logisticians into all 
phases of weapon system life cycle.  Another response has been to improve the way we 
sustain the current inventory.  The logistic community has taken the lead in this 
transformational effort under its Expeditionary Logistics for the 21st Century (eLog21).  
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Initiative eLog21emphasizes a more strategic sustainment approach.  This will require a 
collaborative approach with other functional communities, using Performance-Based 
Logistics (PBL) and Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP).  Yet another approach taken 
by DoD and the USAF is to eliminate excess capacity under the Base Realignment and 
Closure (BRAC) process, realigning resources to minimize duplication of effort and 
eliminating unnecessary facilities.   
On the financial management front, over the past decade, DoD and the Services 
have been emphasizing the importance of Reduction in Total Ownership Cost (R-TOC) 
and Cost as an Independent Variable (CAIV).  Under these financial concepts, more 
emphasis has been placed on using the cost estimate as a basis for making trade-off 
determinations between the delivery schedules and performance requirements.  Of 
course, in making any trade-off decisions, the users will have to assess the level of risk 
they are willing to accept and then make determinations on the best way to deal with that 
risk.  One primary reason for accurately capturing the sustainment requirement, a reason 
that ties in with the restrictive fiscal environment, is the high cost associated with this 
phase of the Life Cycle Cost.  This phase of the weapon system life cycle typically 
consumes as much as 65% of the TOC, and is spent over years if not decades (Figure 5).  
When dealing with costs comprising approximately 65% of a multi-billion dollar 
program, spread out over a number of fiscal years, it is imperative that the costs be 
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Figure 5. System Life Cycle Cost by Category (Source: MN3331 Course: 
Principles of Systems Acquisition and Program Management, 2004). 
 
Starting off with an overview of the fiscal environment provides a framework for 
understanding of how funding constraints indirectly impact on all aspects of the operation 
and support phase, and lays the foundation for understanding how the requirement, 
funding and contracting processes are inextricably linked.  Additionally, having an 
understanding of the inherent instability of the funding process gives a better appreciation 
for how critical it is to accurately capture the costs for a requirement, then budget for that 
requirement and ultimately execute contracts or support agreements that will deliver the 
desired performance.  More importantly, if the level of funding changes, which inevitably 
it will, having a thorough understanding of the requirement and funding processes 
provides a framework for determining how changes will eventually impact on the most 
important output of the process which is the readiness level of the force. 
B. REPORTING MECHANISMS 
 
Not only must the government business community deal with fiscal constraints, it 
must also deal with other key processes. An important aspect of the operation and support 
phase of a weapon system life cycle that must be understood by the government business 
community is the requirement generation process.  To support the requirement generation 
process, the government business community must either thoroughly understand the 
technical aspects of the sustainment requirement or have access to the experts that do and 
understand the part they play in funding and procuring that requirement.  Sustainment 
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requirements, emerging as an indirect byproduct of the logistic and readiness measures, 
and support requirements in the Mission Need Statement (MNS) and the Joint 
Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) process, cover a broad range 
of categories, but for the purpose of this research project, the discussion will center on 
requirements in general terms as it relates to maintenance and repair of systems and 
subsystems, and all the necessary spare parts, consumables and equipment needed to 
support and sustain a weapon system.  
As previously mentioned in the Introduction, sustainment covers a broad range of 
categories, including but not limited to supply, maintenance, transportation, sustaining 
engineering, data management, manpower, personnel, training, information technology 
(IT), and supportability and interoperability functions4.  Management of these 
sustainment categories starts taking shape in the concept exploration phase, continue to 
develop in the acquisition phase and takes a more definitive form in the operation and 
support phase.  The program manager (PM) initially has responsibility for sustainment 
planning during which the PM will work closely with the end-user Major Command 
(MAJCOM).  Once the weapon system reaches initial operating capability (IOC), the 
gaining MAJCOM and appropriate Air Logistic Center (ALC) will take on a more robust 
role in managing the sustainment program.  This section will look at identifying 
requirements, control mechanisms, stakeholders, and the stakeholder link to the control 
process. 
1. Identifying Requirements  
 
The most difficult part of determining the support needed for a weapon system is 
to first define the sustainment requirement during the early system acquisition phases.  At 
this critical junction, where operation and support life cycle costs are determined, the 
logistic community must work closely with the system engineering community to 
consider supportability as part of the design factor.  Placing logisticians in system 
program offices (SPOs) to incorporate supportability concepts early-on in the design and 
                                                 
4 Department of Defense Instruction, 5000.2.  Operation of the Defense Acquisition System.  2003. 
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into the acquisition phase is one way to reduce the cost and performance risk in the 
operation and support phase of the life cycle which has been done for years.   
In the early phases of the weapon system, defining long-term sustainment is an 
elusive task, but takes shape as the system enters the operational phase and reaches 
maturity.  As the book Visualizing Project Management points out, requirements 
generally start with the needs of the operational user5--in the case of DoD that would be 
the “warfighter”--and ends when the needs of the user are ultimately satisfied.  When it 
comes to the sustainment requirements of a complex weapon system, extending over 
decades for some legacy systems, the requirements are extensive, continuous, widely 
dispersed and often indirectly linked to the ultimate goal (readiness levels).     
Part of identifying and controlling the sustainment requirement is building a 
comprehensive maintenance plan that addresses a number of critical factors.  One factor 
addressed in the plan is the support requirements needed to maintain an operational 
capability at an affordable cost. This approach should consider the repair times, repair 
locations, level of maintenance concept (base, intermediate or depot-level), preventive 
maintenance, reliability and maintainability, transportability and mobility of the weapon 
system and support equipment.  Another critical factor is to determine the organic and 
contractor workload mix.  One other factor to consider is the use of pre-operational 
support (Interim Contractor Support) and post-operational support (Contractor Logistic 
Support).  This includes support in the form of spares, technical orders, support 
equipment, facilities, training, site activation, support planning, system engineering and 
other support-related cost elements. 
The challenge comes not only in planning for and clearly defining the requirement 
in the first place, but also in controlling sustainment requirements to keep the weapon 
system at the highest possible mission capable or aircraft available rate.  Any 
misunderstanding between the user and provider of the support will negatively impact on 
the support provided.  To deal with this inherent risk, each level of support from the SPO 
to the ALC institutes a process for defining and controlling sustainment requirements. 
                                                 
5 Forsberg, Kevin.  Visualizing Project Management.  2000. 
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According to DoD acquisition regulations, the program manager is assigned the 
responsibility of working with the end users to document performance and support 
requirements, considering in the process the objectives, outcomes, measures of 
performance, the resources to commit and the stakeholders’ responsibilities.  The 
program manager is also responsible for initiating any system modifications that will 
improve weapon system performance and reduce total life cycle ownership costs.  
Transformations in the logistic community have placed an emphasis on MAJCOMs 
taking a more proactive role in defining and prioritizing the requirements6 since they will 
ultimately be the bill payers for long-term sustainment efforts.  The primary document 
used in detailing the sustainment approach is the Life Cycle Management Plan (LCMP), 
formerly known as the Single Acquisition Management Plan (SAMP) and/or the Product 
Support Management Plan (PSMP).  The primary purpose behind the LCMP is to provide 
a living document that plans a “cradle to grave” approach, combining both the acquisition 
and sustainment concepts, and eliminating redundancy and conflicting guidance from 
having two separate documents.  From the sustainment perspective, the document is 
refined as the system matures and/or as it changes to meet evolving operational 
requirements.  It also lays the groundwork for transitioning program management 
sustainment responsibility from the Program Executive Officer (PEO) to the Air Logistic 
Center (ALC).  
Over the past decade, all key stakeholders, from elected officials to the defense 
industry, have pushed for streamlining the acquisition process by speeding the 
development and procurement cycle, reducing total ownership costs (R-TOC) and 
improving reliability and maintainability.  On the operation and support side, the impetus 
of late in the Department of Defense (DoD) has been to link support to a capability.  
Under this concept, requirements are linked to end user-defined capabilities that are 
documented in JCIDS.  The USAF has recently published AFI 63-101- Operations of 
Capabilities Based Acquisition System to implement this DoD 5000.2 requirement.  The 
"support as a capability" concept is focused on reducing cycle time and improving 
                                                 
6 HQ USAF/ILI. White Paper on “Future Financials - More Combat Capability for the Dollar Spent,” 
September 2004. 
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program credibility, but the end goal is to deliver better combat capabilities to the 
warfighter.  
2. Control Mechanisms 
 
Once the requirement in the form of a capability has been defined, the next step is 
to determine the best way to measure performance.  Performance-based logistics is the 
DoD preferred methodology to measure the support provider’s performance in meeting 
the requirement.7  The metrics that are used to keep score must be delineated in the 
logistical support contract if the capability is provided by a defense contractor or 
documented in support agreements if the capability is provided by an organic 
(government) provider.  Of course, the next logical step is to monitor the metrics on a 
continuing basis to determine whether the performance delivered is achieving the goal, a 
step which the GAO has accused the DoD of not addressing8. 
Over the past decade, due to tight discretionary funding available to DoD and the 
excess utilization capacity in both the DoD and in the commercial sector, there has also 
been a push towards having defense contractors take on a more active role in providing 
for long-term sustainment of weapon systems, under the assumption that they have 
commercial business models that will improve performance and reduce ownership costs.  
Under Contractor Logistic Support (CLS), as the contractors’ role changes to take on 
more responsibility for sustainment so too has the contractual arrangements.  The 
concepts of requirement ownership have emerged in the form of Total System Support 
Responsibility (TSSR), Total System Support Integration (TSSI) and Total System 
Performance Responsibility (TSPR). 
Taking the sustainment requirement concept one step closer to the operational 
support level, as the weapon system nears the deployment phase, the program manager 
must make decisions on the best approach to take in supporting the fielded weapon 
system.  The SPO will use the Source of Repair of Assignment Process (SORAP) to 
                                                 
7 AFI 63-101 Operations of Capabilities Based Acquisition System, Paragraph 5.2.2.16. 
8 Government Accountability Office. Defense Management: DOD Needs to Demonstrate That 
Performance-Based Logistic Contracts are Achieving Expected Benefits (GAO-05-966).  Sep. 2005. 
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allocate organic and commercial depot workload and other decision-making processes for 
making supply chain management assignments.  In making determinations on the source 
assignment, AF Corporate stakeholders are involved in making the final decisions.  The 
allocation of sustainment support, including maintenance/repair/overhaul workload, and 
supply chain management can take different avenues.  The contractor tends to heavily 
influence the determination process by the way support is structured in ICS 
arrangements, but consideration must be given to the plethora of public laws that place 
restrictions and guidance on the workflow requirements. 
Influencing the source assignment process are several public laws.  The 
overarching guidance for depot maintenance falls under the Title 10 USC 2464- 
Definition of Depot-Level Maintenance and Repair umbrella.  From this title comes a 
series of other sections: Title 10 USC 2464- Core Logistics Capability, which states each 
military department must maintain organic depot maintenance capability; Title 10 USC 
2466- Limitations on the Performance of Depot-Level Maintenance of Material, which 
states each military department must maintain an annual dollar ceiling of no more than 
50% contract depot maintenance; Title 10 USC 2469- Contracts to perform workloads 
previously performed by depot-level activities of the Department of Defense: requirement 
of competition, which covers workload shifts of greater than $3 million that must be 
competitively sourced on a merit-based selection process; and Title 10 USC 2474- 
Centers of Industrial and Technical Excellence: Designation; Public-Private 
Partnerships, which calls for a best value depot maintenance and repair approach.  To 
ensure internal compliance with these public laws, the USAF has implemented AFI 63-
107- Integrated Product Support Planning and Assessment as guidance in drafting a 
sustainment strategy, placing primary responsibility in the hands of the Program 
Manager. 
Within the DoD, project management of any aircraft sustainment program is a 
critical operation that involves numerous stakeholders and processes, all focusing on 
defining requirements, allocating scarce resources and executing the plan.  The process of 
transforming product support requirements into sufficient funding is a multi-step process.  
Failure of stakeholders to communicate effectively at any point in the process can 
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jeopardize the funding for the operation and support requirements which will ultimately 
impact the mission capable rates and the overall mission.  Therefore, as each stakeholder 
role is identified, the respective control mechanisms will also be acknowledged to include 
key success factors and good practices.   
Since there is a distinct separation between requirements and funding authority 
processes, early and continual collaboration and communication among stakeholders is 
vital to adequately fund product support. The cornerstone for success is a true teaming 
relationship with industry partners, internal Air Force functionals, and other government 
stakeholders involved in the acquisition system framework.9  Although regulatory 
guidance outlines specific control mechanisms at most levels of responsibility, required 
control mechanisms are more specific for the stakeholders at the Major Command 
(MAJCOM) and higher level.  Each stakeholder in the sustainment process has their own 
objectives and responsibilities.  Regardless to whether these objectives and 
responsibilities are required by law or regulation, are of a business nature or personal 
preference, tied to politics or not, they affect the ultimate outcome of every acquisition 
phase. Hence, it is vital for each stakeholder to have control processes and mechanisms in 
place and for them to encourage open communication in order to gauge each process of 
their respective activities to ensure each is successfully accomplished.  As the book 
Performance Measurement & Control Systems for Implementing Strategy points out, 
managers use formal, information-based procedures and routines to maintain or change 
patterns in organizational activities.10 The author goes on to say: 
 
Performance measurement and control information can be understood only 
by reference to some model of underlying organization process.  In other 
words, managers must understand the process by which inputs are 
converted into outputs (Figure 6).11 
 
 
                                                 
9 AFI 63-101 Operations of Capabilities Based Acquisition System. 
10 Robert Simons.  Performance Measurement & Control Systems for Implementing Strategy.  New 
Jersey: Prentice-Hall.  2000. Chapter 1, page 4. 
11 Robert Simons. Performance Measurement & Control Systems for Implementing Strategy, (New 
Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 2000) Chapter 4, page 59. 
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Figure 6. Inputs, Process, Outputs Model. 
 
In DoD’s case, the output should be matched with achieving sustainment goals 
such as efficient product support and adequate funding for mission success.    From a 
DoD perspective, narrowed specifically to the sustainment topic, the inputs include 
everything needed to provide product support; information, personnel, funding, contracts, 
labor, support product or service, etc.  The process includes transforming all the inputs 
into a product or service for the end-user.  Finally, the output is product support for 
sustainment; more specifically, the desired outcome is a high level of readiness.  But a 
manager cannot merely understand these three factors and expect to measure or change a 
process.  Two additional factors must be included in the model; a standard or benchmark 
to compare against actual performance and a feedback channel to communicate variances 
so action can be taken.  When combined the “inputs, process, outputs” model, it is 
referred to as the Cybernetic Feedback Model as illustrated below (Figure 7).12  
 
 
Figure 7. Cybernetic Feedback Model. 
                                                 
12 Robert Simons. Performance Measurement & Control Systems for Implementing Strategy, (New 
Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 2000) Chapter 4, page 61. 
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Using this type of model, managers can then gather information and choose 
among the three categories (inputs, process, and output) to determine where he or she will 
devote attention to ensure that outputs are matched to the overall strategy.  Later in this 
section, the Cybernetic Feedback Model will be used as a basis for analyzing the 
reporting and control mechanisms. 
3. Stakeholders 
 
Returning our focus to the stakeholders, key players in the sustainment process 
consist of Congress, the President, the Office of Management and Budget, contractors, 
Combatant Commanders, the Air Staff, MAJCOMs, and the operational end-users. 
However, the main focus of this discussion will be concentrated on the Air Force 
Corporate Structure that implements the PPBE system, the Aeronautical Systems Center 
(ASC), Air Logistics Centers (ALCs), and Program Managers that provide logistical 
support a.k.a. Product Support. MAJCOMs make up the main decision-making body for 
sustainment program requirements.   
The MAJCOM responsible for Air Force aircraft sustainment programs is the Air 
Force Material Command (AFMC).  AFMC logistically supports every weapons system 
through the use of ASC Product Centers that are responsible for research, development, 
test, evaluation and initial acquisition of aeronautical systems and related equipment for 
the Air Force, and ALCs that provide logistics support for the entire Air Force aircraft 
inventory.13   Although Air Force aircraft sustainment programs are managed by the ASC 
Wing at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio, there are numerous key stakeholders 
outside ASC that play a vital role, affect, and therefore have a vested interest in the 
process.  Within the DoD, the stakeholders other than ASC in the sustainment decision-
making process include everyone from the Air Staff to MAJCOMs that funnel funding to 
ASC and ultimately the appropriate SPO for product support, to Combatant Commanders 
that utilize various MAJCOM assets (aircraft, pilots, maintenance personnel and support 
equipment).   
                                                 
13 Retrieved from http://www.usaf.com/orgs/5.htm Oct. 2005. 
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According to the Weapon Systems Intelligence Integration (WSII) Handbook, the 
Air Staff is at the top of the approval list for Air Force requirements: 
   
 Under supervision of the Chief of Staff of the Air Force (CSAF), 
the Air Staff serves as the military staff of the Secretary of the Air Force 
(SAF) and is responsible for the efficiency and operational readiness of 
the Air Force. The Air Staff organization is primarily concerned with, and 
plays a vital role in providing resources to the Air Force Major Commands 
(MAJCOM); ensuring that operational forces are properly trained, 
equipped, and maintained; and providing overall guidance and support to 
the operating commands. The Air Staff is the focal point for the 
documentation, coordination, and oversight of requirements within the Air 
Force. All weapon system requirements for Air Force MAJCOMs are 
coordinated, evaluated, and approved by the Air Staff.14 
However, the Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution process is 
actually implemented using a unique process called the Air Force Corporate Structure 
(AFCS).  Per AFI 16-501, Control and Documentation of Air Force Programs, the goal of 
the AF PPBE process is to achieve the defense objectives established by the President 
and the SECDEF in the DPG.  DoD Directive 7045.14 states the Heads of DoD 
Components are responsible for developing and executing programs and managing 
resources, and achieving national security objectives and requirements.  Though not 
specifically mandated by OSD, the AFCS has served as the means through which the AF 
fulfills this responsibility in the planning, programming and budgeting phases of the 
PPBE.  The benefits of the AFCS increases management effectiveness by applying 
judgment and experience to programs, resource limitations, and other program 
adjustments while balancing competing goals and matching the limited resources where 
they are desperately needed.15 Air Force Instruction 16-501, Control and Documentation 
of Air Force Programs, defines the Air Force Corporate Structure (AFCS) as the 
corporate review process for HQ USAF.  The primary objective of this forum is to 
provide an avenue for cross-functional decision making.  The AFCS membership is 
                                                 
14 Weapon Systems Intelligence Integration (WSII) Handbook; June 1999, Chapter 5, paragraph 5.1 
The Air Staff, retrieved from http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/usaf/wsii/037GZ005DOC.htm Oct. 2005. 
15 AFI 16-501 Control and Documentation of Air Force Programs. Paragraph 2, page 2. Aug. 1999. 
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actually broken down into four distinct levels: the Air Force Council, Air Force Board, 
Air Force Group, and Mission/Mission Support Panels.  The AFCS is a centralized 
corporate body, internally regulated and subject to reconfiguration based on the 
chairperson at each level.  When using the term “corporate,” the Air Force is referring to 
themselves as a unified organization, not as a business corporation.  Once a “corporate” 
decision has been made, the decision becomes the official AF position.   
As the DoD Directive 7045.14 states, “the ultimate objective of the DoD PPBS 
[PPBE] shall be to provide the operational commanders-in-chief the best mix of forces, 
equipment and support attainable within fiscal constraints.”  The PPBE system essentially 
provides a means for senior leadership of a component or service to make resource 
allocation determinations to best meet this objective.  Therefore, it is crucial for the lower 
levels of management to aptly translate MAJCOM requirements into cost estimates to 
have any hope of correctly funding those requirements.    
In the planning phase, AF Planners (AF/XPP) will use the Defense Planning 
Guidance (DPG) to produce AF specific planning and programming guidance, such as 
AF Vision 2020, AF Capability Investment Strategy (AFCIS) and the Annual Planning 
and Programming Guidance (APPG).  The purpose of these documents is to provide a 
basis for programmers to convert threats into effects-based capabilities.  All planning 
documents are reviewed by the AFCS, with final approval by the SECAF and CSAF. 
In the programming phase, the AF Programmers (AF/XPP) will create an effects-
based program in the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) to meet the capabilities, 
mission and objectives as stated in the specific AF planning guidance.  The programming 
phase is the point in the process when the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) 
conducts an initial program review, and subsequently issues Program Decision 
Memoranda (PDMs) to make changes to the programs.  For this phase, the AFCS is 
responsible for matching available resources against valid requirements to create a 
balanced AF program for the FYDP.  During the latter part of this phase, the AF Deputy 
Chief of Staff (DCS) for Plan and Programs (AF/XP) will work with OSD/PA&E on 
matters affecting the AF POM.  This typically results in additional Program Decision 
Memorandas (PDMs), which typically require offsets within the AF budget. 
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The budgeting phase follows the planning and programming phases, and is when 
SAF/FMB takes on more of a leadership role in the AFCS.  The AF budget developed in 
this phase will be evaluated jointly by OMB (Office of Management and Budget) and 
Office of Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) (OSD/C).  Any changes in the Budget 
Review (BR) will be issued in the form of Program Budget Decisions (PBDs).  Since the 
final product from this phase will eventually become the Air Force’s portion of the 
President’s Budget, the AFCS becomes heavily involved in reviewing PBDs and 
evaluating the impacts from recommended offsets.   
Major Commands (MAJCOMs- e.g., Air Combat Command, Air Mobility 
Command and USAF in Europe), Headquarters Air Force (HAF) functionals, Direct 
Reporting Units  and Field Operating Agencies also interact with the AFCS during the 
development of the POM and BES, and throughout the year on other resource-related 
issues.  During the POM and BES cycles, PPBE issues brought forward by agencies and 
departments primarily enter the process via mission/mission support panels.  On a case-
by-case basis, issues may bypass the panels, entering the AFCS by way of functional 
communities and ad hoc Integrated Process Teams (IPTs).  These issues enter the AFCS 
at various levels, depending on the importance of the matter, and at the discretion of the 
AF/CV. 
The logistic requirements to support fielded items in the sustainment phase 
ultimately have to come from the MAJCOMs that utilize and manage the assets.  They 
must communicate those needs clearly to the respective PM that oversee the budget 
building process for funding the requirements.  The financial cost estimate forwarded 
through this process is known as the FINPLAN.  Controlling the logistic requirements 
process is critical to ensuring reliable systems and valuable support to the warfighter and 
as indicated, involves not only the Combatant Commanders, but the MAJCOMS as well.  
At the PM level, also reporting to the AFCS, are Program Element Monitor (PEM) teams 
who are responsible for specific programs within the AF (e.g. one PEM is responsible for 
a single weapon system like the F/A-22).  Along with PEMs at the PM level, Concept of 
Operations (CONOPS) Champions are teams who are responsible for specific effects-
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based capabilities.  At the PM level, these PEMs translate MAJCOM requirements into 
cost estimates that ultimately will be included in the BES. 
4. Stakeholder Link to Control Process 
 
Linking the stakeholders to the control process is the Earned Value Management 
System (EVMS).  The SPOs for major weapon systems monitor sustainment contract 
performance using EVMS and Integrated Baseline Reviews (IBRs).  The IBR is a joint 
assessment by both the contractor and DoD of the contractor’s Performance 
Measurement Baseline that covers the entire scope of work to ensure the work is 
realistically and accurately scheduled and the right amount and mix of resources have 
been assigned to accomplish all contractual requirements.16  The PM and SPO are 
responsible for conducting the IBR. Throughout the research efforts, no information was 
discovered to expound upon control mechanisms the ALCs use, or how they fit into the 
PPBE or requirements process.   
The IBR is the formal management review component and an integral part of the 
EVMS.  The EVMS is a standardized cost, schedule and performance measurement 
control system used in DoD acquisition programs17.  The IBR uses outputs from the 
EVMS in monitoring the funds expended on a contract (cost variances) and the progress 
made on the contract (schedule variances).  During the IBRs, the technical capability of 
the product or level of support provided (performance) is also evaluated.  The objective 
of the IBR is to focus the DoD program manager on any potential threats to the 
sustainment contract as soon as possible in any of these three areas (cost, schedule and 
performance), and to take any necessary actions before the problems reach a critical point 
where the contract scope of work can no longer be achieved.  The DoD program manager 
is essentially using the IBR as a means of minimizing contractual performance risk by 
focusing on information that is directly relevant to the completion of the desired outcome, 
that being a successful completion of the sustainment contract.     
                                                 
16 AF Acquisition Handbook, IBR Team Handbook, Jan. 1999. 
17 Earned Value Management Systems (EVMS) are a contractual requirement for DOD major 
contracts with dollar thresholds >$70M for RDT&E contracts and >$300M for production contracts. 
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In terms of the Cybernetic Feedback Model18, the IBR is used in controlling 
contractual cost, schedule and performance.  The IBR is a way of focusing and 
motivating the contractor to achieve the goal as detailed in the contractual plan.  The goal 
is to determine if the contractor is making progress toward the contractually stated 
objectives.  In completing the goal, the DoD does not want surprises that will put 
sustainment at risk.  The process is being monitored using deductive means (using 
EVMS), and deals with a very complex and diverse undertaking.  Additionally, the 
process is examining the past and present progress as it relates to fixed budgetary targets 
(the standards).  The process is also focusing on negative feedback, primarily using 
management by exception.   
Now turning to the specifics of the Cybernetic Feedback Model, the SPO and 
contractor negotiate the expected contractual outcome during initial contract negotiations, 
and the inputs, processes and outputs are then aligned to provide for and monitor progress 
towards the negotiated outcome.  The inputs into the model include the equipment, 
people and tasks needed to perform the statement of work in the contract.  Once the 
inputs have entered the model, the next step is to process the respective cost data into a 
usable format.  At this point the costs are allocated to cost accounts [a.k.a. work 
breakdown structure (WBS)] as the work is performed.  In the EVMS system, the output 
(feedback) is a series of cost data reports19 that provide the user (the program managers 
and financial managers) with cost and schedule variances on the contractor’s status on 
contract performance.  The budgetary boundaries used in the variance analysis are 
determined ex ante during the initial contract negotiations, and allocated down to the 
WBS level with a cost account manager (CAM) responsible for one or more WBS.   The 
budget is the roadmap to follow during the execution phase of the contract, and any 
deviations from the plan will be scrutinized during the IBR.  At this stage, the DoD 
program manager will examine any negative EVMS feedback on a management by 
exception basis. 
                                                 
18 Department of Defense Instruction, 5000.2.  Operation of the Defense Acquisition System.  2003. 
19 Commonly used Earned Value Management System (EVMS) cost reports for an Integrated Baseline 
Review are the Cost Performance Report (CPR) and Cost/Schedule Status Report (C/SSR). 
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The EVMS feedback data, as previously mentioned is the cost and schedule 
variances.  This data is generated ex post to work completion and provides a feedback 
loop in the IBR review process.  The DoD program manager can use the variances to 
determine whether the contractor’s performance is on schedule and within cost, and can 
then direct limited management time on problem areas to make ex post adjustments to 
inputs and/or processes.  The variance outputs are a signal on what the DoD program 
manager feels is important to monitor and control.  Since overspending a contract is an 
Anti-Deficiency Act (ADA) violation and punishable by law, the DoD program manager 
is negatively incentivized to keep costs within budget, and establishes controls to limit 
the risk of the contractor having a cost overrun and possible ADA violation.  
These performance measures (cost and schedule variance) are primarily focused 
on the output end of the model due to the fact that the cause and effect relationship 
between costs and support are either too complex given the nature of sustainment 
support, not well understood by the DoD program managers or simply too costly to 
monitor in the input and process stages.  Direct monitoring of every WBS on the contract 
is beyond the span of control of most DoD program managers.   
To further complicate matters, there are internal and external tensions in this 
business relationship.  In this particular case, there are tensions between the different 
participants in the IBR system in regards to how they manage costs and profits.  This 
leads to an incomplete management control system and to dysfunctional behavior.  
Examining the contractual relationship mainly from a financial perspective, the 
participants, the DoD and contractors, view the contractual funding arrangement 
differently.  The DoD is primarily concerned with keeping the contract within costs while 
at the same time ensuring the contractor is able to stay on schedule and deliver the agreed 
to performance or product.  The contractor shares the same aforementioned concerns as 
DoD, but with one major difference, the contractor has a profit motive that may put them 
at odds with DoD. 
As one can visualize, there are numerous reporting channels and requirements in 
the sustainment process. These mechanisms and requirements span the entire chain of 
stakeholders from operational end users to top level decision-makers, and communication 
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at each stage is critical to the success of any program.  As previously outlined, there is 
not one clear line of authority and therefore, entities rely heavily on the inputs, processes, 
outputs and collaboration of others.  DoDI 5000.2 stipulates the PM is responsible for 
collaborating with the end users to document performance and support requirements;20 
“Even though the PM is not the ultimate decision-maker for source selection, recent 
changes in the logistic community are requiring that MAJCOMs take a more active role 
in defining and prioritizing requirements.”21 Therefore, there must be mechanisms in 
place to facilitate effective communication between the stakeholders.  According to the 
authors of Three Programs and Ten Criteria, the Air Force has established a structured 
approach for communicating and reporting program status at every level.22  The authors 
advocate setting aside specific time, either on a monthly or more frequent schedule, to 
ensure that vital communication is not placed on the back burner.   
The purpose of this section was to provide a broad overview of the requirement 
generation and control process as it pertains to the sustainment phase of a weapon 
system.  It is imperative for the business community to have a thorough understanding of 
how this critical process ties into the business community functional processes for the 
reasons that will be discussed in later sections.  
C. THE FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT PERSPECTIVE 
 
Now turning to the specifics of funding the sustainment requirements, once the 
sustainment requirements have been identified and then prioritized as a funded 
requirement, the next step is to perform the funding function which includes such 
activities as building the cost estimate for the requirement, then budgeting for it and 
finally monitoring the execution of the budget.  Many of the funding processes are in 
place to show key stakeholders (Congress, DoD and Air Staff) where funds will be spent 
(i.e., the budget) and how efficiently the funds are being spent (i.e., the execution).  The 
remainder of this section will address the funding process from the cost to the budget 
                                                 
20 Department of Defense Instruction 5000.2, Paragraph 3.9.2.3. 
21 HQ USAF/ILI. White Paper on “Future Financials - More Combat Capability for the Dollar 
Spent.” September 2004. 
22 Johnson, Robert V. and Birkler, John. Three Programs and Ten Criteria. RAND, 1996, Page 24. 
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execution phase, and the implications on properly funding the sustainment requirements 
from a financial management functional perspective. 
1. Building the Cost Estimate 
 
When balancing between cost, schedule and performance, detailed cost estimates 
must support the trade-off decisions.  As with any requirement, whether it is a research or 
procurement effort, there must be an estimate of the costs for that particular effort, using 
the different cost estimating methodologies.    The methodologies can be a combination 
of parametric, expert opinion, extrapolation and analogy cost modeling techniques.  The 
cost estimate for the sustainment requirement is documented in operation and support 
cost elements that were recently revised and standardized by the Office of the Secretary 
of Defense Cost Analysis Improvement Group (OSD CAIG).  The OSD CAIG groups the  
total sustainment requirement into the following six major cost element categories23: 
1.0 UNIT PERSONNEL 
2.0 UNIT OPERATIONS 
3.0 MAINTENANCE 
4.0 SUSTAINING SUPPORT 
5.0 CONTINUING SYSTEM IMPROVEMENTS 
6.0 INDIRECT SUPPORT 
As one Institute for Defense Analysis expert pointed out in a briefing on operation 
and support costs, one of the challenges in performing an operation and support cost 
estimate is in defining the scope and boundaries of the estimate by knowing the costs to 
include (relevant costs) and the ones to exclude24.  The expert argued for including all 
costs directly traceable to the weapon system that would only exist if the system exists.  
This links back to requirement generation.  The cost estimator must understand how the 
operation and support costs relate to system characteristics, support concepts and 
operating concepts.  The system characteristics include reliability, maintainability and 
                                                 
23 Office of the Secretary of Defense. Cost Analysis Improvement Group.  Final Working Draft of 
Operating and Support Cost Estimating Guide.  2005. 
24 Wilson, Jim.  Cost Analysis Research Division, Institute for Defense Analysis briefing on 
“Operation and Support Cost Analysis.”  Jun. 2004.  
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design factors.  The support concepts include the way the weapon system approaches 
maintenance, supply and training concepts.  The operating concept is concerned with 
planning for wartime versus peacetime operations. 
Using the Cost Analysis Requirement Description (CARD) and/or similar type 
data as the source document, cost estimators and support financial managers will allocate 
sustainment requirement costs into the six broad CAIG cost elements, further breaking 
them down into sub-cost elements to encompass the total operation and support 
requirement.  For the purpose of this research effort, the cost estimate discussion will not 
go into great detail into any of the cost element categories, because each weapon system 
will, for the most part, have distinct requirements in each category, but instead will focus 
in general terms on how the cost estimators and support financial managers go about 
building the operation and support cost estimate and then budgeting for it.  In building the 
cost estimate, every effort should be made to ensure the costs are applied to the 
appropriate cost element.  In some cases the costs will be spread over multiple cost 
elements or not be required at all for that particular cost element.  If a determination must 
be made on the best cost element to use for allocating costs, the two principles to use in 
making that determination are first to try to keep the cost in the appropriate major 
category listed above, and second to include costs in the predominant cost element if the 
costs cannot be segregated into multiple cost elements25.  Of course any determinations 
such as this must be properly documented in the cost estimate. 
To aid the cost estimator in building an estimate, the Office of Secretary of 
Defense (OSD) requires the Services to develop a database for reporting operation and 
support costs, called Visibility and Management of Operation and Support Cost 
(VAMSOC).  The Air Force uses a database called Air Force Total Ownership Cost 
(AFTOC) to fill this requirement.  One caveat on the data from this system is that it may 
not be complete or easily transferable to another weapon system, and will need to be 
analyzed and adjusted to fit the cost estimate under consideration.  
The major cost categories are for cost requirements at the unit, organizational and 
depot level, and the effort can fall to either an organic--AF or other governmental 
                                                 
25 Office of Secretary of Defense, Cost Analysis Improvement Group. Final Working Draft of 
Operating and Support Cost Estimating Guide. Sep. 2005.  
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agency--or to a contractor.  One area to pay particular attention to when building the cost 
estimate is the increasing use of contractor support in the sustainment phase.  Special 
emphasis must be placed in the identifying the cost elements using contractor logistic 
support.  The costs associated with this contractor provided support must be separately 
identified for decision making, reporting, contractual and performance measurement 
purposes.  The contractor-related cost elements will be comprised of various Work 
Breakdown Structure (WBS) cost accounts that have different cost behavior.  These cost 
accounts are separated into direct, indirect, recurring and non-recurring cost categories.  
The direct cost WBS accounts should be traceable to the sustainment requirement.  The 
indirect cost WBS accounts, such as general administration and overhead, are not 
traceable to the sustainment requirement but do support it.  The continuous workload 
WBS cost accounts are classified as recurring costs (variable costs), typically funded with 
an Operation and Maintenance Appropriation, and the one-time capital investments, for 
such items as facilities and equipment, are classified as non-recurring costs (fixed costs), 
typically funded with a Procurement Appropriation.  It is important for decision making 
purposes to accurately categorize the costs according to their behavior type to understand 
the impact on sustainment from either increasing or decreasing costs in certain WBS cost 
accounts.   
On the organic side--the government run operations--the costs elements are 
broken down into a series of Budget Activities (BAs) and further subdivided into 
Elements of Expense Investment Codes (EEICs) or Budget Programs (BPs)26.  In the 
case of converting appropriated funding into the Working Capital Fund (WCF) accounts, 
the funds are subdivided into the respective activities group, primarily the Supply 
Maintenance Activity Group (SMAG) or Depot Maintenance Activity Group (DMAG)27.   
Now when it comes to large-scale depot maintenance and repair, and supply 
workload determinations, all of which are major components of TOC, the Business Case 
Analysis (BCA) becomes the tool of choice for making that kind of enterprise-wide 
                                                 
26 AFMAN 65-604 Appropriation Symbols and Budget Codes provides a complete list of BAs, EEICs 
and BPs for all appropriations. 
27 The Air Force Working Capital Fund also includes the Information Services Activity Group (ISAG) 
and Transportation Activity Group (TAG). 
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decision.  In accordance with the public laws mentioned in the Identifying Requirement 
section, some of the workload will inevitably be sourced to organic providers without the 
need of a BCA.  For the workload open to the source assignment process, a BCA will be 
performed to assist the decision makers in making a “best value” source determination.   
Citing the growing importance of BCAs, SAF/FM recently issued a document, titled 
Interim Guidance for Business Case Analysis to standardize BCA methodology across 
the financial management community28.  The purpose of standardizing the process is to 
provide a tool that will support all USAF strategic decisions across all functional 
communities and at all levels of the organization.  The BCA brings us one step closer to 
being more efficient and effective in the way we spend our funding. 
The financial management community routinely uses Analysis of Alternatives 
(AoAs) for ACAT I (and ACAT II and III as directed) milestone decisions and Economic 
Analyses (EA) for small-scale investment projects.  The BCA bridges the gap between 
these two types of decision support tools.  Though a BCA may mirror the AoA and EA in 
some aspects, the main difference is the approach taken in the execution phase as 
documented in the Change Management Plan section of the BCA.  The Change 
Management Plan identifies the key stakeholders, documents the action plan and 
delineates key performance measures and outcomes.  The BCA essentially serves as 
stand-alone decision making tool linking the requirement, the costs, the benefits, the 
budget and the performance parameters, and should be later used as a control mechanism 
of an ongoing management control system. 
2. Formulating and Executing the Budget 
 
The budget process is another aspect of the funding environment that is important 
to understand when funding sustainment requirements.  It is directly linked to the cost 
estimate and more importantly, indirectly linked to the readiness and warfighting 
capability objectives of a program.  Under the current SECDEF regime, the budget 
execution phase in particular has been emphasized as the control mechanism for ensuring 
limited discretionary funds are being spent on the capabilities necessary to successfully 
                                                 
28 SAF/FM memorandum on “Interim Guidance for Business Case Analysis.”  Mar. 2005. 
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accomplish the mission.  Successfully executing the sustainment budget requires the 
translation of the cost estimate to the next stage, the budget formulation and execution 
phase.  This transition from a cost estimate to an executable budget requires a thorough 
understanding of the different “colors of money” and the intricacies of the budgetary 
process as it pertains to the sustainment process. 
Funding for the sustainment requirement strategy requires the use of all 
appropriation sources, though the majority of the funding comes from Operation and 
Maintenance, and Military Personnel Appropriations, and the Working Capital Fund 
(WCF).  Overriding the use of all Appropriations is the “Purpose” (what you can spend), 
“Amount” (how much you can spend) and “Time” (when you can spend) rules.  In 
accordance with Title 31, USC 1301(a), “appropriations shall be applied only to the 
objects which the appropriations were made except as otherwise provided by law.”  This 
statute pertains to the Purpose for which the appropriation may be spent.  The allocated 
funding may only be spent on those sustainment requirements requested for in the 
President’s Budget, to include the supporting budget documents (FINPLANS, CLS 
Brochures, etc.).  The Amount relates to the funds provided by Congress and 
subsequently allocated/allotted to the end user.  When it comes to the Amount, the user 
can not spend more funds than they have been allocated.  The Time rule has to do with 
the number of years the appropriated funding is available in which to obligate and expend 
the allocated funds.  The figure below lists the obligation and expenditure years for all the 
appropriations (Figure 8).  After the cost estimate has been calculated in a specific Base-
year (kept constant using the OSD Raw Inflation Index), the estimate must then be time-
phased over the fiscal years, adjusting for inflation (converted to Then-year dollars using 




Figure 8. Appropriation Obligation and Expenditure Years. 
 
 
When it comes to funding product improvements (a modernization program) the 
funding stream is not as straightforward as for the other requirements.  The following 
figure depicts the correct appropriation source depending on production, performance and 





















• Second-to-last row of boxes represent the appropriation types used to fund the 
development, test & evaluation of the product improvement.
• Last row (Procurement box) represents the appropriation type used to fund the 




Figure 9. Product Improvement Funding Decision Tree. 
 
 
In the early stages of the Operation and Support phase, as programs plan for their 
long-term sustainment approach, most programs typically use an Interim Contractor 
                                                 
29 Source: BCF103 Fundamentals of Business Financial Management. 
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Support (ICS) type contractual arrangement, funded through an investment 
appropriation30.  In an ICS type arrangement, a contractor provides the initial support for 
the weapon system.  Once the program converts to a long-term sustainment arrangement, 
the sustainment requirement converts to O&M Appropriation funding, with the exception 
of initial spares and common support equipment which will continue to fall under the 
Procurement Appropriation.  It is at this stage when the lead MAJCOM takes on the role 
of funding the sustainment requirement.  During this stage of the funding process, the 
Budget and Execution phases of the PPBE process, Bases, SPOs and ALCs submit their 
sustainment requirement budget estimates to the responsible MAJCOM Financial 
Management Branch, who then rolls-up the estimates for submission to SAF/FMBO.  
The consolidated budget estimate is then validated through the AF Corporate Structure 
and once approved by OSD become part of the President’s Budget (PB).  Once Congress 
enacts the PB into an Appropriation Bill and the President signs it, the funding is then 
warranted from the Treasury, apportioned by the Office of Management of Budget, 
allocated to the Services, allotted to the MAJCOM Financial Management Branches and 
finally sub-allotted down to the respective Bases, Air Logistic Centers (ALC) and/or 
System Program Offices (SPO).  Funds may also transfer to an ALC by way of a Project 
Order.   For funds sent to the contractor, a contract is the source document for obligating 
the funds. 
One area of special interest in the requirement and funding process is the 
allocation of funding for partnership efforts between the organic depots31 and contractors.  
According to DoDD 5000.1, "sustainment strategies shall include the best use of public 
and private sector capabilities through government/industry partnering initiatives, in 
accordance with statutory requirements32."  When it comes to funding partnering 
arrangements, organic depots generally prefer “Workshare” type funding arrangements, 
whereas contractors prefer “Direct Sales” type arrangements.  Under a Workshare 
funding arrangement, funds for organic support are sub-allotted directly to the organic 
                                                 
30 Office of Secretary of Defense, Cost Analysis Improvement Group. Final Working Draft of 
Operating and Support Cost Estimating Guide. Sep. 2005. 
31 The term “organic depot” is referring to government workload providers, for example an Air 
Logistic Centers (ALCs). 
32 Department of Defense Directive 5000.1.  The Defense Acquisition System.  May 2003. 
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provider who then negotiates the delivery schedule with the prime contractor.  Under a 
Direct Sales arrangement, the prime contractor is funded in the contract for organic-
provided workload.  In this type of arrangement, the government is in essence serving as 
a subcontractor to the contractor.  The organic depots argue that a Workshare type 
arrangement saves the government on higher pass-through indirect costs charged by 
contractors under Direct Sales arrangements.  The contractors, on the other hand, argue 
for funding control via contractual arrangements with organic providers in order to 
maintain a Total System Performance Responsibility (TSPR) role to limit non-
performance risk from an organic provider.  An argument could be made that from the 
PM's standpoint the added pass-through costs associated with Direct Sales may be worth 
the cost of transferring oversight from the PM to the contractor.  One could further argue 
the contractor not only has the experience and processes to monitor performance, but also 
has a vested interest, through incentivized contracts, to have the support provider, an 
organic depot in this case, perform according to contractual specifications.  On the flip 
side, if the contractor's are primarily concerned with performance risk, the organic depots 
success with Lean Transformation efforts should be factored into the decision making 
process in favor of a Workshare type of arrangement.  Whatever the underlying reasons 
may be for the particular type of arrangement, the approving authority for the 
arrangement ultimately depends on dollar thresholds, type of arrangement and parties 
involved.  In most instances, either the AFMC/CC or the ALC/CC will be the approval 
authority33. 
One issue mentioned in partnering arrangements that should not be overlooked by 
the financial manager is the manner in which to incentivize contractual performance.  
This is applicable to both the organic and contractor support providers, though the 
financial incentive measures are primarily applicable to private sector support providers, 
non-financial measures, on the other hand, are applicable to both.  The contractual aspect 
will be discussed more thoroughly in the Contracting section.  Suffice it to say that during 
the design of the contract vehicle the financial manager must be involved early in the 
                                                 
33 Draft of AFMC Depot Maintenance Partnering Guide, Apr. 2003. 
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acquisition planning process to provide financial advice to ensure the funds are made 
available to cover the requirement and incentive or award fee structure. 
In summary, the funding is another important aspect of the sustainment phase to 
understand.  It is important to understand how the requirement fits into the cost estimate 
and then how the cost estimate is used to build a defensible and executable budget.  In 
building the cost estimate, the cost estimator must define the scope and boundaries of the 
cost estimate, and then when it comes to putting together the budget, the financial 
managers must be able to defend the contents of that budget.  In defending the budget, the 
financial manager must have a thorough understanding of the requirement and 
subsequent cost estimate that makes up the budget submission, and understand how 
changes to the budget will indirectly impact on readiness levels.  Lastly, the financial 
manager must be able to provide funding expertise to support the budget execution phase 
of the sustainment strategy, whether it is in the form of an organic, contractor or 
partnering type approach. 
D. THE CONTRACTING PERSPECTIVE 
 
The idea of contracting for the long term sustainment of major weapon systems 
brings with it new challenges and issues that must be addressed before the full potential 
of PBL type arrangements can be realized.  This section will discuss contracting and what 
should be done to facilitate the arrangement for the requirement/capability while also 
reducing the associated risks involved.  The key contracting elements identified in this 
section will essentially serve as a model for conducting a case study on the two weapon 
systems identified for our analysis (F-16, and C-17), determining how each program 
office approaches sustainment from a contracting perspective.  Key elements will be 
taken from the following areas:  Managing the Relationship, Managing the Contract, and 
Managing the Risks. 
1. Managing the Relationship 
 
The recent push by our leadership to shift toward a PBL strategy has given rise to 
new unintended consequences that must be addressed before we can fully realize the 
potential benefits.  One such consequence is the move that must be made toward 
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asserting more emphasis on managing the relationship with the contractor.  The PBL 
approach characterizes itself on the ability to gain public and private sector capabilities 
through strategic partnerships with industry.  This collaborative approach is distinctly 
different than the adversarial relationship that has historically existed between 
government and industry.  In order to facilitate the success of PBL support arrangements, 
the old standing culture of secrecy and distrust by the government and industry must 
begin to erode.  Open communication, early involvement by all key stakeholders, and 
trust must begin to surface in order for PBL arrangements to be as effective as possible.  
Although it may be initially difficult to quantify and measure the value of these 
relationships, there are tools that can be implemented and used to facilitate a good 
working relationship with the contractor.  One such tool is the formation of a PBL team 
early in the acquisition process.  When forming the PBL team, the government (Program 
Manager) should establish the team with the purpose of developing and managing the 
implementation of a PBL weapon system support strategy.  The team should consist of 
government and private-sector functional experts who are able to work across 
organizational boundaries.  As mentioned earlier, this may require a cultural change for 
the government and industry as both stakeholders have traditionally had an adversarial 
pull and take relationship versus a collaborative relationship.  By implementing PBL 
oriented Integrated Product Team (IPT), both parties will ensure consideration 
throughout the design, and development of the support strategy, as well as obtaining an 
optimum PBL strategy that will leverage both government and industry best practices in 
the most cost effective manner34. 
2. Managing the Contract 
 
The preferred PBL contracting approach is the use of long-term contracts with 
incentives that are tied to performance.  These incentives should be tied to metrics that 
are tailored to the specific performance requirements and should be designed to decrease 
government risk while incentivizing contractor performance and cost control measures.  
Although there has been an increase in the number of sole source support services 
                                                 
34 Defense Acquisition Guidebook. Defense Acquisition University (chap 5.3). Retrieved from 
http://akss.dau.mil/dag/Guidebook  Sep. 2005. 
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contracts, in general, PBL contracts should always be sourced competitively to foster a 
process that encourages price reductions.  That being said, one of the most powerful tools 
the government has that serve to reduce and manage PBL risk is the structuring of the 
contract itself.  For PBL type contracts, a set of metrics needs to be developed with 
involvement from the end user of the support.  These metrics must relate directly to the 
end user’s requirement and should be easy to gather, accurately measurable, and 
validated against the contractor’s performance.  The overarching goal of a PBL 
arrangement is to compress the supply chain, eliminate non-value added steps, reduce 
Total Ownerships Cost, and improve readiness for weapons systems and commodities.  
For those reasons, goals should be facilitated through the contractually established 
metrics that focus on such areas as Reliability/Maintainability/Availability (i.e. on time 
delivery, production lead time etc), Readiness (i.e. mission capable, non mission 
capable), Requisition (i.e. backorder age, fill rate) and, Inventory Turnover Rate35.  
Noncompliance with contractually established metrics has a direct impact on warfighter 
readiness.  Therefore, it is essential that the government and contractor have a complete 
understanding of those metrics and the repercussion of noncompliance.  Consequently, 
incentives, penalties and adjustments can be a powerful tool in supporting the 
performance objectives of a PBL contract by motivating a contractor to achieve defined 
objectives.  Incentives can be monetary with the establishment of an award fee/incentive 
fee pool; or non-monetary, exhibited by contract extension, exercise of options, or longer 
contract term.  Contract incentives can take a positive or negative focus, and are generally 
used to motivate positive behavior36.  When establishing monetary contract incentives it 
is important to note that incentive fees are designed to incentivize the contractor to 
control costs while award fees are designed to incentivize the contractor to improve 
performance.  An analysis should be done to examine which aspects of the contract the 
end user values most.  If cost control is more important than performance, more emphasis 
should be placed on structuring an incentive fee.  If, however, performance is valued 
                                                 
35 Defense Contract Management Agency.  (Oct. 2002). Performance Based Logistics Support 
Guidebook. p4. Department of Defense. 
36 Defense Contract Management Agency.  (Oct. 2002). Performance Based Logistics Support 
Guidebook. p24. Department of Defense. 
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more than cost control then an effective award fee structure should be emphasized more 
heavily.   
3. Managing the Risks 
 
For any weapon system, throughout the systems life cycle, risk must be 
considered as a critical part of the equation.  The responsible agency, whether it is the 
government or a contractor, must address ways in which to mitigate risk by avoiding, 
eliminating or accepting the risk.  Before discussing the tools used to identify and 
mitigate some of the risk inherent in PBL arrangements, it’s important to note that under 
a PBL contractual agreement, significant risk is transferred from the government to the 
contractor.   Figure 10 depicts the evolution of risk transfer, from full Organic 
(government operated logistics) to full CLS (Contractor Logistics Support). 
 
Figure 10.  Risk Transfer under Performance Based Logistics. 
 
It is for this reason that a proactive effort needs to be established by the PBL IPT 
to effectively identify and employ tools to mitigate risk associated with PBL 
arrangements early in the support acquisition process. 
A risk based Pre-award Survey is one general means of identifying and providing 
valuable information about prospective contractors and the associated risk they may bring 
to the government.  A pre-award survey is an evaluation of a prospective contractor's 
capability to perform under the terms of a proposed contract, and assists the government 
in the selection of capable suppliers by identifying acquisition risk and developing 
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contracts that can be successfully completed37.  This evaluation of contractors is used by 
the Contracting Officer in determining the prospective contractor's responsibility38.  The 
results obtained from the survey should assist in the award/no award recommendation, as 
well as include recommendations to the customer as to how to mitigate the risks 
identified39. 
An additional area of concern involving early identification of risk is the recent 
legislative initiatives allowing contractors more flexibility with regard to the pricing of 
their products and services. This flexibility has crippled the government’s ability to 
determine price reasonableness by obtaining certified cost or pricing data in some PBL 
arrangements. TINA (Truth in Negotiations Act) regulation requires that the contractor 
submit cost or pricing data for negotiated procurements above a certain threshold.  The 
information submitted by the contractor must also be certified (by the contractor) as 
being current, accurate, and complete at the time of the submission.  To that degree, 
TINA serves as a tremendous leveraging tool for the government allowing them to 
effectively determine price reasonableness by verifying and validating the contractor's 
cost accounting system.  However, exceptions to the TINA requirement, one of which is 
commercial item designations, have crippled the government’s effort to obtain fair and 
reasonable pricing.  Any product or service that receives a commercial item designation 
is exempt from TINA requirements.  Furthermore, with the passing of FARA (Federal 
Acquisition and Reform Act and FASA (Federal Acquisition and Streamline Act) 
legislation, the definition of commerciality has been expanded, making it easier for 
contractors to classify products and services with a commercial item designator.  The 
dilemma comes to surface when, as a result of commercial item designation, contractors 
are relieved of submitting certified cost or pricing data.  This in itself may not be of great 
importance except for the fact that more and more support service acquisitions with 
bigger price tags are being categorized as commercial thereby removing a critical tool the 
                                                 
37 Defense Contract Management Agency.  (Oct. 2002). Performance Based Logistics Support 
Guidebook. p17. Department of Defense. 
38 http://www.gpo.gov/procurement/ppr/ppr_chap11.html Oct. 2005. 
39 Defense Contract Management Agency.  (Oct. 2002). Performance Based Logistics Support 
Guidebook. Page 17. Department of Defense. 
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government uses to negotiate fair and reasonable prices.  To put this into perspective the 
Air Force acquisition of the JPATS (an ACAT 1C program) aircraft was determined to be 
a commercial acquisition and was pursued under a commercial sole source contract40.  In 
addition, the CLS (Contractor Logistical Support) portion of JPATS was also considered 
commercial and its solicitation, valued at over $134M, was not subject to certified cost or 
pricing data review (S.L. Drago, Contracting Officer, personal communication).  That in 
itself illustrates the amount of potential risk that the government typically inherits when 
contracting for support services, as well as underscores the need to find effective tools for 
negotiating large ticket ACAT level sustainment contracts without the use of cost and 
pricing data.  That is why enlisting the assistance of support agencies (e.g. DCAA and 
DCMA) to help determine price reasonableness is essential.  If cost and pricing data is 
not obtainable by the government, these support agencies have other tools at their 
disposal designed to assist the contracting officer and program manager in determining 
price reasonableness. 
 With the application of the tools, processes, and procedures discussed in this 
section (i.e., managing the relationship, managing the contract, and managing the risks), 
the contracting functional community will be able to formulate better decisions that will 
increase the likelihood of a successful weapon system support acquisition.  The contract 
actions identified in this section will serve as a framework for questions that will be 
posed to program managers and contracting officers for the identified weapon systems to 
be evaluated (F-16, and C-17).  The responses received will serve as a basis for analysis, 
recommendations, and suggested good practices that should be used for the acquisition 
support of future weapon systems. 
E. SUSTAINMENT BUSINESS MODEL 
 
For the business community, the approach to sustainment of a weapon system 
centers around one critical question: what support is required to successfully accomplish 
the mission.  With a number of competing perspectives, this question is not as easy to 
                                                 
40 Joint Primary Aircraft Training System. (2001). Single Acquisition Management Plan for the Joint 
Primary Aircraft Training System (Milestone III). Page 11. 
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answer as one would expect.  First the overarching objective must be defined.  In this 
case, the overarching objective is what the customer, the warfighter, considers as the goal 
of the sustainment effort.  In the Sustainment Business Model (Figure 11), the goal from 
the perspective of the warfighter is defined as "readiness" in terms of having a weapon 
system that supports the operational forces according to key performance parameters and 
thresholds that will enable the warfighter to complete the mission, in other words, 
provides a warfighting capability.  For an aircraft weapon system, readiness and 
warfighting capability are measured at the operational level in terms of metrics such as 
Aircraft Availability, Non-mission Capable for Supply or Maintenance and 
Cannibalization rates to name a few.  The business community is responsible for costing 
out, budgeting for and procuring the requirements, via contractor and/or organic provided 
support, to achieve these operationally-focused metrics. 
 
 
Figure 11. Sustainment Business Model adapted from the Balanced Scorecard 






1. Description of Sustainment Business Model 
 
From the literature review on the Operation and Support phase of a weapon 
system's life cycle, the project team narrowed down the focus to three critical areas that 
have been recognized as necessary for a successful sustainment program: Reporting 
Mechanisms, a Financial Management Perspective and a Contracting Perspective.  These 
three critical areas have been structured into a model adapted from the Balanced 
Scorecard methodology41.  The Balanced Scorecard model serves as a way to exploit the 
intangible, as well as the tangible resources in an organization, and in the process identify 
the key success factors that an organization must focus on to achieve their objective.  In 
DoD's case, that focus should be on readiness and successful mission accomplishment.  
In the center of the model is the Customer's Perspective.  The cloud encircling the 
Customer's Perspective is indicative of the fact that the operation and support provided by 
the business community functionals is often difficult to directly link to the end goals of 
readiness and warfighting.  The arrows pointing from the three critical areas towards the 
center, to the Customer Perspective, indicate all effort in these external areas should be 
focused on the customer's readiness and warfighting capability goals.  The external 
arrows pointing towards each of the three external critical success factor areas indicate 
that all three areas are intrinsically linked and interdependent on one another.  This 
descriptive analysis will now turn to the details of the three critical success areas, each 
with their own success-oriented goals, and measures, techniques and structure, all which 
should be directed towards achieving the customer's end goal(s).   
a. Reporting Mechanisms 
  
  As for Reporting Mechanisms, the primary goal is to identify and control 
sustainment requirements.  The focus in this area is on having the structure and processes 
in place to identify and control requirements.  One of the most important considerations 
is to have clear lines of authority between all the key stakeholders which will delineate 
each participant's area of responsibility in the decision-making process, especially for 
                                                 
41 Simons, Robert. Performance Measurement & Control Systems for Implementing Strategy.  2000.  
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oversight boards which heavily influence the process.  The process used by the all 
participants in the sustainment approach is the Planning Programming Budgeting and 
Execution (PPBE).  It is a mechanism for transitioning the requirements identified in the 
programmatic stage into an executable and defendable budget.  Influencing the process at 
the lower operational levels is different forums.  This includes group activities such as 
Integrated Process Teams (IPTs), Requirement Planning Councils (RPCs), and others.   
b. Financial Management Perspective 
 
  The funding approach has at its heart the goal of program affordability and 
determining best value.  This is in-line with recent financial efforts to use costs as an 
independent variable in trade-off decisions, applying cost realism in the cost estimation 
process, and reducing total ownership or life cycle costs.  The measures and techniques in 
this area focus on the affordability and best value goals which should be in alignment 
with the customer's goal.  The measures and techniques include the application of 
decision support tools, cost estimating methodologies and PPBE.  To support the 
decision-makers in making enterprise-wide determinations, decision support tools, such 
as a business case analysis or similar methodologies, are used to capture and report costs 
and benefits.  The output from the decision support tools are used later in the budget 
formulation and execution phases of the PPBE process.  The Earned Value Management 
System or similar type processes are used in the execution phase of the PPBE process, 
serving as a means to monitor and control the expenditure process.   
c. Contracting Perspective 
 
  The Contracting Perspective is the last critical area that will be analyzed 
using this model.  The success factor goals in this area are incentivizing contractor 
performance and fostering a competitive environment.  These goals are aimed at reducing 
cost, and increasing the customer's goals of a high level of readiness and enabling 
warfighting capabilities.  To do this, the contracting functional uses a number of 
measures and techniques.  One such technique is to use the appropriate contract type, 
ranging from cost-plus to fixed-price type contract arrangements.  In addition to contract 
type, the contracting functional used an award/incentive fee structure to either encourage 
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performance, reduce cost or both.  When it comes to the incentivizing contractor 
performance, performance metrics are a critical aspect of the management control 
structure.  The performance metrics must be documented and agreed to in the contract 
and then monitored during the contract execution phase.   
F. CONCLUSION 
 
The purpose of the literature review is to provide an informed foundation on 
factors critical to the business community in successfully supporting a long-term 
sustainment program for a major weapon system.  In this literature review, a description 
of the current fiscal environment was given as a backdrop for the problems facing 
programs in the sustainment phase.  During the research, the project team identified three 
main areas in which to categorize the critical business community success factors: (1) 
Reporting Mechanisms; (2) Financial Management Perspective; and (3) Contracting 
Perspective.  Based on these three main areas, the project team constructed a Sustainment 
Business Model for analyzing a weapon system.   
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III.  DESCRIPTION OF WEAPON SYSTEMS AND DESCRIPTIVE 
ANALYSIS OF BUSINESS APPROACH 
In this section, the research team will provide a description of the weapon systems 
and conduct a descriptive analysis of the weapon systems using the Sustainment Business 
Model presented in Chapter 2.  The two weapon systems are the F-16 Falcon, a mature 
weapon system, and the C-17 Globemaster, a more recently-fielded weapon system.  This 
section will examine the business practices applied by the System Program Offices 
(SPOs) in their respective approach to long-term sustainment of the weapon systems.  
The analysis will be based on information provided by the SPOs, using the Single 
Acquisition Management Plans (SAMPs), Operational Requirement Documents (ORDs) 
and other internal SPO documentation. 
A. DESCRIPTION OF WEAPON SYSTEMS 
 
 1. F-16 Falcon Description 
 
Originally developed by General Dynamics, now Lockheed Martin, the F-16 
Fighting Falcon is a multi-role, multi-mission, “combat-proven” fighter aircraft that 
provides the United States and 23 other countries a comparatively low cost means for air 
dominance and close air support.  From a prototype in 1975, the program has grown to 
over 4000 aircraft located around the world.  The fighter can be configured with air-to-air 
as well as air-to-ground munitions. It has the capability and range to strike precisely, 
return to base and within minutes, be reloaded and return to battle over and over again.  
These characteristics allow the USAF, U.S. allies, and designated foreign military air 
forces through the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) Program to sustain a competitive 
advantage of air superiority over enemy combatant aircraft.  Sustainment for the F-16 has 
been accomplished on a sole source basis to Lockheed Martin via firm fixed priced and 
cost reimbursement contracts.  The F-16 program is considered in its midlife of service as 
the “nation’s premier combat fighter.”42 
                                                 
42 ALC/YP, Single Acquisition Management Plan (SAMP) for the Falcon 2020 Follow-on, F-16 
Global SAMP, Annex 029, Dated 25 October 2001. Hill AFB Utah. Executive Summary, page 10. 
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2. C-17 Globemaster Description 
 
Since reaching full-operational capability in 1995, the C-17 Globemaster has been 
the USAF's leading strategic and theater airlift aircraft having the capability of delivering 
large payloads, flying long distances, accessing austere locations, and airdropping troops 
and equipment.  The Boeing Company is the prime contractor for the weapon system 
though the contract was initially awarded to the McDonnell Douglas Corporation which 
has since merged with Boeing.  The USAF has programmed for the procurement of a 
total of 180 C-17 Globemasters, and the Royal Air Force has leased four aircraft43.  The 
C-17 entered the initial concept phase in the late 1970s as a means to fill an airlift 
capability shortfall.  Full-scale development began in 1986.  During this time, the aircraft 
was plagued with technical problems and subsequent funding shortfalls that led to 
schedule slippages and cost increases.  Under a looming Congressional threat of program 
cancellation, Boeing, over a two year period, eventually resolved the design, concurrency 
and production problems, though at the expense of a smaller fleet size, decreasing from 
210 to 120 aircraft.  Over the past decade, the fleet size has since increased to the current 
requirement of 180 aircraft.  As it stands now, the last lot buy will be in FY07.   
For operational support, the C-17 is following a two-level maintenance strategy at 
the organizational and depot-level in order to minimize the special test facilities, skills, 
tools and equipment needed at the base-level.  The maintenance requirements and 
concepts originated from Logistic Support Analysis and Repair-Level Analysis trade 
studies.  Following the recommendation of the Depot Support Strategy (DSS) study that 
found no cost advantage to pursuing either a full Contractor Logistic Support (CLS) or 
organic maintenance support strategy and which recommended a mixed approach, the C-
17 SPO extended the Interim Contractor Support (ICS) contract pending final 
determinations on the depot approach, but kept the propulsion system as CLS-for-life.  
To contract for these maintenance support requirements, the program transitioned to a 
Total System Support Responsibility (TSSR) contractual arrangement44 with the prime 
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contractor, and implemented a public-private partnering approach with the organic 
depots.  The original TSSR contract was termed "Flexible Sustainment" but has since 
been renamed the "C-17 Globemaster III Sustainment Partnership" (GSP).  The C-17 
SPO listed the following qualitative factors for pursuing a partnering approach: 
Expanding the industrial base, creating a competitive environment to keep the program 
affordable, enabling dual sourcing, building a surge capability, complying with Title 10 
and leveraging off of the partners' strengths.  Under the partnering relationship, Core 
workload was to fall under the Air Logistic Centers, and non-Core workload was to be 
determined through the Source of Repair Assignment Process (SORAP).  HQ AFMC/LG 
was to lead the SORAP in accordance with AFI 63-107.  This was an effort to leverage 
industry and organic capabilities to reach a best value sustainment strategy that complied 
with Title 10 requirements.  Pratt-Whitney, the propulsion subcontractor, continued to 
operate under a full CLS arrangement for off-wing repair and overhaul of the F-117 
Engines.  The performance metrics in this GSP contract included: Flexible Sustainment 
Aircraft Availability (FSAA), flying hours achievable, Mission Impaired Capability 
Awaiting Parts, Aircraft Depot Maintenance Scheduling Effectiveness, issue 
effectiveness and customer satisfaction45.  Material management was to be determined 
through the Source of Supply Assignment Process (SOSAP) which is similar to a 
SORAP. 
B. DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS OF BUSINESS APPROACH 
 
1. Reporting Mechanisms 
 
As previously depicted, the separation between requirements and funding 
authority processes requires early and continual collaboration and communication of 
Financial Managers (FM) and key stakeholders to adequately fund product support.  The 
FMs on individual IPTs provide the critical link at each level to translate requirements 
into readiness.  There are several forums, boards and IPTs that orchestrate this process.  
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The mainstay in this process is communication.  This section will look at each program 
and how management controls the process. 
a. F-16 Falcon Reporting Mechanisms 
  
  As outlined in the F-16 Global Single Acquisition Management Plan 
(SAMP) and related annexes, the Program Management Directive (PMD) for the F-16 
program directs all activities.  The F-16 program is categorized as an Integrated Weapons 
System Management Program (IWSM) and falls under the direct authority of the 
Program Executive Officer for Fighter and Bomber Programs (AFPEO/FB).46  The PMD 
specifies the implementation of the Post Production Support (PPS) for the F-16 Program 
named “Falcon 2020” which ensures contractor support of the entire F-16 fleet.  The 
PMD also serves as the basis for the System Program Directors’ (SPD) development and 
continuance of the PPS.  Based on recent Acquisition Reform Initiatives, the Falcon 2020 
contract allows the F-16 SPO to consolidate numerous requirements through multiple 
contracts into one all-encompassing contract.  This “streamlining” allows the SPO to 
provide the users with sufficient flexibility to meet readiness levels. As of 1 Mar 2002, 
the Falcon 2020 contract’s period of performance spans 23 years.47 
According to the “Program Management” section of the F-16 SAMP, the 
F-16 Systems Program Office (SPO) is responsible for reporting status and program 
issues to the PEO.  The SPO is currently in two locations and is managed by the SPD and 
the System Support Manager (SSM). The F-16 SPD falls under the Aeronautical Systems 
Center (ASC), Wing at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base (WPAFB), Ohio.  The SPD has 
overall responsibility for the management and sustainment services required for the PPS 
Program.  The F-16 SSM is located at Hill Air Force Base, Utah and is responsible for 
providing management interface between the Falcon 2020 contract working levels and 
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the SPD.  The SSM has the authority to allocate available resources according to the 
needs of the F-16 program within specific dollar thresholds.48   
Since the beginning of the F-16 Program, the F-16 has been upgraded 
and/or converted several times.  The result of these upgrades has left the Air Force and 
other users with eight different “Block” versions.  In addition to these modifications, the 
SPO is responsible for sustaining the entire fleet to include aircraft sold through the 
Foreign Military Sales (FMS) Program.  As the USAF maintains a configuration baseline 
for each Block version, any changes to the baseline are only made after the approval of 
the F-16 Joint Multinational Configuration Control Board (JMCCT/B).  The process 
involves the respective stakeholders and specifically addresses technical feasibility, risk, 
schedule budget and manpower. Approval is required before any changes or 
modifications are contracted for.  However, for depot level repair, the determination for 
contractor versus organic responsibility is accomplished through the AF Source of Repair 
Assignment Process.  Normally, if support is not available within time constraints or is 
“design unstable,” Interim Contractor Support is used. 49 
As the F-16 is categorized as an IWSM program, is it managed by several 
Integrated Product Teams (IPTs).  Membership of the IPTs is made up of personnel from 
the product center at ASC/YP at Wright-Patterson AFB, OH, and the depot center at OO-
ALC at Hill AFB, UT.  The SPO IPTs are at the tip of the spear in resolving all problems 
or issues.  The necessary support for each IPT is derived from personnel in all functional 
disciplines and the contractor, LM-Aero.  These teams, and ultimately the SSM and SPD, 
are responsible for presenting quarterly reviews to the PEO.  In addition, monthly reports 
are submitted which serve to update information, schedule and other issues on each 
acquisition.50    
Periodic meetings of these product teams called Technical Interchange 
Meetings (TIMS) are used to discuss “detailed definitions of requirements.”  However, 
the responsibility of defining requirements, acquisition and modification of aircraft falls 
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on HQ ACC/XRMA.51  These requirements are added to the Falcon 2020 contract via 
issuance of “task and delivery orders” once approved by the Joint Requirements Review 
Team (JRRT).  The JRRT is a standing board established to review sole-source 
requirements, which helps ensure competition is practically maximized.  These 
requirements comply with the AF corporate strategy, Public Law and DoD Directives.52   
  Contracting Officers (COs) at both ASC and ALC are authorized to add 
task and delivery orders to the contract via the process of “decentralized ordering” in 
support of PPS.  A Contract Technical Monitor (CTM) resides in both locations within 
the SPO.  The CTM acts as a POC and provides assistance to the contractor, SPO and 
personnel from the functional disciplines.  The COs and CTMs also hold routine forums 
with the contractor to review in-process orders to ensure cost, performance and schedule 
requirements are met.    
From the Financial Management perspective, each requirement added to 
the Falcon 2020 contract is independent and is funded as such.  Each office that generates 
a requirement(s) is responsible for budgeting and executing for that requirement(s).  
Quarterly Program Management Reviews (PMR) evaluates each task/delivery order 
where a Cost Plus or Time and Material pricing arrangement is utilized.  The PMR is 
chaired by the SSM and SPD deputies.  As far as forums revolving around the budgeting 
and execution function, the SPO documentation does not go into such detail.   
b. C-17 Globemaster Reporting Mechanisms 
 
  The Air Force Program Executive Office, Airlift and Trainers 
(AFPEO/AT) is responsible for the C-17 program.  The C-17 SPD is responsible to the 
PEO for program execution, and responsible to ASC/CC for sustainment issues.  The C-
17 SPD coordinates program requirements with HQ AMC/XP.  The first step in the C-17 
Business Management Process is the C-17 Requirements and Planning Council (R&PC), 
which is co-chaired by the C-17 SPD and AMC/XP.  The council provides a roadmap for 
all requirements and consolidates the short-term requirements and long-term plans for 
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improvement.  Reviews link the direction between program requirements and program 
acquisition.53   
  The R&PC provides a forum for program-wide presentation, discussion, 
and review of C-17 program initiatives, requirements and activities involving planning 
and road-mapping activities.  The council consolidates both near and long-term product 
improvement plans.  The reviews foster unity between the planners (HQ AMC/XP) and 
the acquisition world (ASC/YC) and provide critical guidance for the C-17 program 
elements.  The Supportability Operations Review Team and Crew Operations Review 
Team are forums specifically designed to review and map out proposed improvements or 
changes to the C-17.  The recommendations by both the SORT and CORT are then 
forwarded to the R&PC for consideration and approval. 54 
  The SPD has solidified the importance of creating and implementing 
partnerships between the Prime Contractor and the ALCs.  This is accomplished through 
the Global Sustainment Partnership (GSP) formed by the C-17 SPD.  Via the Flexible 
Sustainment Annex to the original SAMP, the GSP includes members from the C-17 
SPO, ALCs, members of headquarters at both AFMC and Air Mobility Command 
(AMC), and Boeing.  Every 60-90 days, SAF/AQ and AF/IL and all stakeholders referred 
to as “Gatekeepers”, provides direction on sustainment and partnering to the GSP which 
in-turn reports progress.  Based on guidance from gatekeepers, Boeing acts as the Total 
System Support Responsible (TSSR) contractor and partners with ALCs for Core 
workload of the C-17 for long-term sustainment.55 
  The C-17 program has implemented an Integrated Management 
Plan/Integrated Master Schedule (IMP/IMS).  The IMP/IMS defines and schedules all 
tasks required to meet program level goals and includes the contractor and SPO.  It is 
broken out into six major elements. The top three levels are managed by the Baseline 
Change Board.  The lower levels are managed by individuals IPTs. 
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2. Financial Management Perspective 
 
For the two weapon systems, the Financial Management Perspective section of 
the Sustainment Business Model will be used as a basis for conducting the study.  The 
overarching financial management considerations of each weapon system are either 
program affordability and/or best value.  In this examination of each weapon system, the 
focus is on providing greater detail on the manner in which the programs achieve 
affordability and best value.  The analysis will also consider financial topics of interest 
that may prove beneficial to other weapon systems in structuring their financial 
management strategies supporting a long-term sustainment strategy.   
a. F-16 Falcon Financial Management Perspective 
 
  According to the F-16 Single Acquisition Management Plan, the program 
has embraced the Reduction in Total Ownership Cost (R-TOC) concept, factoring it into 
each new acquisition decision.  For the F-16 program and products, the overall contract 
cost risk is considered low to moderate.  In determining the cost risk, as well as cost 
factors for estimating purposes, the SPO applies the concept of Cost as an Independent 
Variable (CAIV).  In the programs most recent Product Support Management Plan 
(PSMP), the F-16 SPO described the way in which the geographically separated unit acts 
as a single entity to provide the product, the product being an affordable combat-ready 
aircraft.   In the PSMP, the number one mission goal is to provide the warfighter with the 
most capable F-16 at the lowest cost.  To accomplish this, the SPO is divided into four 
main organizational groups, one such group being the Business Group.  The Business 
Group is further divided into three parts: Financial, Contracting and Personnel 
Management.  ASC/YPF is the Financial Division at Wright-Patterson AFB, and is 
responsible for all USAF and Foreign Military Sales (FMS) financial matters.  Similar 
functions fall under the Logistics Support Division (OO-ALC/YPL) organizational 
structure at Ogden-Air Logistic Center (OO-ALC).   
 In recent years, the F-16 SPO has used the Business Case Analysis (BCA) 
decision support to select providers based on best value and affordability.  One aim of the 
BCA was to balance the workload between public and private sector sources.  The 
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program believes the BCA is integral to selecting the highest quality goods and services, 
while at the same time delivering products quicker and at a lower price.  
 In the late 1990's, the program implemented a program called the Product 
Support Business Area (PSBA), as part of a management strategy to reduce costs.  PSBA 
initiatives at the time were credited with over $16.4 million56 in cost reductions which 
alleviated Total Obligation Authority (TOA), making it possible to fund more 
modernization efforts.  For depot level repairs, the program made contractor versus 
organic workload determinations through the Source of Repair Assignment Process 
(SORAP), and used Interim Contractor Support (ICS) for support items that were either 
time critical or had an unstable design.  Additionally, the F-16 SPO used program 
schedules termed "F-16 Road Maps" as a means for documenting requirements for block 
upgrades.  The SPO used these scheduled program requirements in constructing POM 
and FYDP submissions. 
 As a means to control costs the program established the Program 
Management Oversight of Life Cycle Support (PMOLCS) Plan, a precursor to the PSMP.  
Additionally, the program created a Cost Reduction Integrated Product Team (CRIPT), 
trained on the R-TOC concept, and tasked them with identifying cost drivers and securing 
funding for cost reduction initiatives.  As a starting point, the F-16 established a cost 
baseline for the three major appropriations: Research Development Test & Evaluation 
(RDT&E), Procurement and Operation and Support (O&S).  The F-16 SPO's overarching 
goals were to improve customers support and lower operating costs.  In order do so, the 
program needed to identify and understand the costs in the baseline.  This R-TOC 
approach allowed the SPO to focus efforts on high cost drivers which were tracked to 
determine whether the cost reduction measures in these areas were successful.  The SPO 
reported that the FY98 total O&S cost estimate had increased by $837 million by FY0157.  
One high cost driver, comprising 21% of the total O&S cost estimate, was the Depot 
Level Reparables (DLRs) which alone had increased by $232 million.  The SPO argued 
that whether efforts in R-TOC of O&S were to be successful would depend largely on the 
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subsequent impact cost savings measures would have on potential Reliability, 
Maintainability and Supportability (RM&S) improvements.   The SPO attributed the cost 
growth to increases in weapon system usage, and rising repair and replenishment spare 
prices.  They further stated the aging weapon system platform and diminishing 
manufacturing source (DMS) as contributing factors to the cost growth. 
b. C-17 Globemaster Financial Management Perspective 
 
 One of the four top-level C-17 goals is to lower life cycle costs.  This goal 
is measured by monitoring the Acquisition Program Baseline at a summary level and 
individual contracts and support cost indicators.  The program also purports to actively 
applying R-TOC initiatives in controlling program costs.  The following descriptive 
analysis details some of the funding strategies used by the C-17 to keep the weapon 
system affordable and provide for best value. 
 Looking first at the decision support tools, one of the primary financial 
management tools used by the C-17 program to support the final long-term sustainment 
and Core workload recommendation was the Business Case Analysis (BCA).  The SPO 
initially used a Cost Benefit Analysis (CBA) but discontinued its use due to being ill-
suited for analyzing the sustainment effort in that it fostered an unhealthy competitive 
environment.  In the C-17 BCA, the SPO documented the long-term sustainment 
direction and the supporting analysis, and also incorporated a performance-based 
partnership between the AF and Boeing.  The objective of the partnership was to meet 
performance requirements, reduce costs, provide best value, and comply with Title 10 
Core and 50/50 statutes.  In the end, the BCA supported the Core workload 
recommendation, the TSSR designation and Direct Sales arrangement, but the most 
beneficial aspect of the BCA was that it served as a baseline for future cost and 
performance initiatives. 
 As for the cost estimating approach, in the early stages of the program, the 
C-17 SPO used a Joint Cost Model to provide a basis for assessing the impact of cost 
reduction initiative on all cost elements.  For the long-term sustainment Program Office 
Estimate (POE), covering FY03 to 33, the program used the Operation and Support Cost 
Analysis Model (OSCAM) to provide a baseline in evaluating the contractor's cost 
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proposals.  The POE was based on Boeing's January 2002 cost estimate for long-term 
sustainment and on historical Flexible Sustainment contract costs, and was to be modified 
to account for the public/private partnership arrangements.   
 In addition to serving as the basis for budgeting purposes, the POE also 
served as a foundation for the quantitative analysis for the BCA to ensure a fair and 
reasonable assessment was conducted.  BCA cost alternatives were estimated at the Work 
Breakdown Structure (WBS) level.  To accurately assess the costs over time, a Net 
Present Value (NPV) analysis was accomplished that discounted58 the organic and 
Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) non-recurring investment costs, the Boeing 
Repair of Reparable (RoR) life cycle costs and the ALC RoR life cycle costs.  For the 
NPV calculation, the Boeing cost estimate was used as the baseline, unless the partnered 
estimate came in as plus or minus 10% of the Boeing estimate, in which case the lowest 
estimate would be the preferred choice.  Another unique feature of the BCA was that it 
used a streamlined SORAP to document the recurring costs for the organic Core 
workload.  In calculating the organic costs, similar weapon systems were used as a basis 
for the cost estimate, and in the case of support equipment, price simulations were used to 
determine the costs. 
 An aspect of the funding strategy was to have Boeing Company operate 
under a Direct Sales Partnering Agreement (DSPA) with the three ALCs, HQ AFMC/LG 
and the C-17 SPO (ASC/YC) for the partnering and Core repair/maintenance workloads.  
Implementation Agreements were used between the ALCs and Boeing to transfer Core 
workload to the ALCs.  Non-core repair/maintenance tasks would be subject to a Boeing 
"Best Value" determination59.  Funding for the initial Boeing Flexible Sustainment 
contract was approved in the President's Budget, and the funding line was adjusted after 
results of negotiated contracts.  In standing-up capabilities at the ALCs, Core workload 
was to transfer once funding became available.  Ten Implementation Teams (ITs) at the 
ALCs, supported by cost estimators and planners, determined the time-phasing for costs, 
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estimated recurring and non-recurring cost, and evaluated cost, schedule and performance 
risks against performance metrics.  A unique funding strategy negotiated by the program 
in the depot strategy was to have Boeing, over a five year period, invest $62 million in 
the ALCs in exchange for a long-term Total System Support Responsibility (TSSR) 
performance arrangement60.   This was primarily for investments in capital equipment, 
tech data and manpower.  This came at no cost increase to the Flexible Sustainment 
contract, which has since been renamed the "C-17 Globemaster III Sustainment 
Partnership" (GSP).  Another funding strategy under this contract was the breaking out 
the F-117 Engines as Government Furnished Equipment (GFE).  This direct contractual 
relationship with Pratt-Whitney was credited with lowering the acquisition cost by 
eliminating pass-through charges. 
 The C-17 Flexible Sustainment contract approach predominantly follows a 
firm fixed price strategy, alleviating the need for cost visibility in the contract.  The 
Earned Value Management System was applied for time and material, cost plus and fixed 
price incentive contract line items.  The award fees were tied to Boeing's performance to 
the Flexible Sustainment Aircraft Availability (FSAA) and customer satisfaction metrics.  
An approach taken by the program to accurately capture costs at each stage of the life 
cycle was to break out the product field support into a separate contract.  This highlighted 
the true cost for the activity and added funding flexibility for the support elements. 
 One approach in particular that the program undertook to improve internal 
processes was the concept of Civil/Military Integration (CMI).  Under the CMI concept, 
the program was designated as a pilot program for commercialization, applying the 
benefits of commercial and best-practice management.  For the business areas, they 
conducted market research in applying commercial practices in the various business 
areas, which included Contract/Financing, Terms and Conditions, Pricing, Cost 
Performance Management, Cost Accounting, Property Management and Supplier 
Management.  This was a team effort, comprised of representatives from the SPO, 
Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA), Defense Contract Audit Agency 
(DCAA) and The Boeing Corporation.  The research involved engaging government and 
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industry experts on ways to achieve capabilities and improve manufacturing practices.  
Best practices were to be implemented in future contracts.  The C-17 SPO recommended 
commercial practices in the following areas: Contracts & Financing, Terms and 
Conditions (Risk Areas), Pricing, Cost Performance Management and Cost Accounting61. 
3. Contracting Perspective 
 
Management of the contractual issues is an essential element of the support 
acquisition process that can lead to the long term success or failure of a support 
acquisition for a major weapon system.  The Contracting Perspective of the Sustainment 
Business Model will be used as a framework to analyze the two weapon systems.  The 
focus will be on the identification of tools, processes and procedures established and used 
by the respective SPO’s to obtain the highest level of contractor performance at the best 
value for the government.  This will be done by analyzing the program offices in their 
application of risk management, contract management and relational management with 
the contractor.   
a. F-16 Falcon Contracting Perspective 
 
(1) F-16 Risk Management.  The Falcon 2020 support contract 
consists of a two pronged approach designed to identify both current and future risk 
associated with the sustainment effort of the F-16 weapon system.  The initial approach 
consists of a government-only IPT within the SPO designed to identify, evaluate, and 
mitigate current risks associated with the processes and products inherent to the 
sustainment effort.  Risks are identified as being of a cost, schedule or performance 
nature and a formal process is used to quantify these risks as being high, medium or low.  
For each risk identified, the program office has also outlined a risk mitigation plan.  Risk 
assessment will also be required for future undefined orders.  As such, the SPO owner for 
the requirement is expected to address any risk associated with their program and to 
formulate a risk management mitigation plan as part of the JRRT (Joint Requirements 
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Review Team) process.  Subsequent to the initial government only risk assessment, a 
formal Joint Risk Assessment is initiated for all future risk considerations in which the 
contractor is an active member of each IPT assigned for future requirements as well as 
being an active participant in the risk assessment process62. 
(2) F-16 Contract Management.  The Falcon 2020 follow on 
support contract is a continuation of the previous Falcon 2020 contract awarded to 
Lockheed Martin and is a broadly scoped, long term, sole source IDIQ contract.  The 
initial Falcon 2020 contract had a period of performance of five years.  Due to the 
essential requirement of continuous, non-interrupted, long-term support in order to 
preserve the combat capability of the weapon system, the length of the new contract is 23 
years (1 March 2002 – 28 February 2025).  The primary objective of the contract is to 
provide Post Production Support (PPS), Contractor Support (CS) services, specific Repair 
and Return support as well as additional engineering and sustainment services necessary 
for the continued operation and improvement of the F-16 weapon system.   
  According to the Falcon 2020 SAMP, the contract will consist of 
multiple pricing arrangements to include: FFP, CPFF, T & M, FPIF, CPIF, CPAF, and 
FPLOE.  The JRRT (Joint Requirements Review Team) will recommend the most 
efficient pricing arrangement to be used for each delivery order in an effort to motivate 
contractor performance that is consistent with the overall contract objectives63.   Under 
the area of Cost & Performance Management, contractor performance is regularly 
measured through the application of CPAR (Contractor Performance Assessment 
Reporting System) evaluations for each individual delivery order over the life of the 
follow-on contract.  Contractor performance for future requirements will be identified, 
defined, and measured in separate management plans that are applicable to these 
programs.  Regular program reviews are held for evaluating all cost type arrangements on 
orders.  These reviews are chaired by the F-16 SPD and SSM deputies and focus on 
contractor performance, including cost, schedule, and technical status.  In addition, these 
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reviews include the contractor’s corrective action plans, along with any actions required 
by the government64  
(3) F-16 Relations Management. The Falcon 2020 support 
contract, executed and managed by an IPT, contains several initiatives and formal 
processes that facilitate a collaborative working relationship with the contractor 
Lockheed Martin; an integral part of the Falcon product team.  One of the processes 
described in the SAMP involve the use of Periodic Technical Interchange Meeting 
(TIMs) and are held so that the IPT can discuss detailed definitions of requirements for 
the program.  The SPO also has several acquisition reform initiatives such as the Joint 
Build Process in which the Falcon IPT members (SPO personnel from HAFB/WPAFB, 
Ogden ALC, DCMA/DCAA, and contractor personnel) worked collaboratively to 
develop the contract and determine predefined requirements.  Another reform initiative is 
the implementation of the Early Strategy and Issues Sessions (ESIS) in which early 
strategy sessions were held with senior managers prior to the formal ASP (Acquisition 
Strategy Panel) briefing.  The entire Falcon IPT, including the contractor, participated in 
the sessions in which many recommendations derived from those sessions were 
incorporated into the final ASP presentation.   
  The Business Relationship that the SPO has with the prime 
contractor is also described as collaborative in nature.  The Falcon 2020 program 
manager has a Lockheed Martin counterpart that is involved in almost every aspect of all 
appropriate activities.  Additionally, each predefined order has a SPO and a contractor 
owner who is responsible for the requirement definition and management throughout 
completion65.  
b. C-17 Globemaster Contracting Perspective 
 
(1) C-17 Risk Management. The risk management approach 
employed by the C-17 SPO involves a robust and collaborative effort with the Boeing 
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Corporation (prime contractor) in which the risk management plan is performed using a 
shared data base.  This risk management process, approved by the SPO and Boeing 
management, is based on the traditional Air Force risk assessment guide who assesses the 
likelihood and consequence of a particular event or item.  The risk management team is 
composed of the SPO IPT’s, DCMA personnel, and Boeing contract managers.  Weekly 
telecons are chaired by the SPO Business and Integration IPT as well as the Boeing 
Analysis and Integration IPT and involves all organizational stakeholders.  The shared 
data base is reviewed and discussed with any member of the team being allowed to 
propose candidate items. Items identified through the risk management process are 
classified as either “risks” or “issues”; where risks are potential problems and issues are 
conditions that have already occurred.  The potential user then evaluates the risks 
associated with the identified item(s) and recommendations are discussed with a decision 
to be reached at the subsequent meeting.  The status of the items identified from the 
shared data base is briefed on a monthly basis to both SPO and Boeing management via 
VTC66.     
(2) C-17 Contract Management. The original Flexible 
sustainment program is designed to satisfy the Government’s goals of achieving 
improvements in logistics support and mission readiness as well as providing best value 
to the government.  According to the SAMP, the SPO is expected to award a new sole 
source, Flexible Sustainment contract to the Boeing Company for the period of FY04 – 
11.  The contract type that the government and Boeing will negotiate is a Firm Fixed 
Price (FFP) contract with Award Fees. 
    The number of contract performance metrics was reduced from 15 
on the original base contract to six.  The new performance metrics are designed to focus 
contractor performance at the systems level as well as to give the contractor additional 
latitude to meet the C-17’s operational requirements67.  The contracted metrics associated 
with the new sustainment effort will be similar to those identified in the previous flexible 
sustainment contract to include: FSAA (Flexible Sustainment Aircraft Availability) 
                                                 
66 ASC/YC, Flexible Sustainment Annex to the C-17 Weapon System Single Acquisition Management 
Plan, Dated January 2002.  Updated Apr. 2003. 
67 ASC/YC, C-17 Weapon System Single Acquisition Management Plan, Dated January 2002. 
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flying hours achievable, Mission Impaired Capability Awaiting Parts, Aircraft Depot 
Maintenance Scheduling Effectiveness, issue effectiveness, and customer satisfaction68.   
(3) C-17 Relations Management. The C-17 Flexible 
sustainment program includes specific formal processes designed to increase 
collaboration and early involvement by key stakeholders.  In addition to formal support 
IPTs, there exist additional processes such as the Global Sustainment Partnerships (GSP) 
as well as collaborative contracting arrangements such as TSSR (Total Systems Support 
Responsibility).  The FY04 – 11 Flexible Sustainment contract will have the C-17 SPD as 
the coordinator of the overall weapon system requirements with HQ AMC/XP through 
the jointly chaired “C-17 Requirements and Planning Council.”  Boeing, however, is 
responsible for the overall sustainment of the C-17 aircraft fleet.  The contractor and the 
SPO serve as co-leads for the various IPTs developed in support of the sustainment 
effort69.  
   The Boeing Company also operates the sustainment contract under 
the TSSR concept in which they must agree to the provisions of the RFP which stated 
that the contractor shall “manage, direct, and control requirements and processes using an 
integrated product development and total weapon system level approach.  The required 
outcome of TSSR shall be to achieve the specific operational performance measures 
within contract cost, schedule, and performance requirements, logistics and security.  
TSSR is a Product Support strategy whereby Boeing is responsible for system 
sustainment tasks and the integration of sustainment with production and modifications to 
meet AMC peacetime and wartime requirements”.  The SAMP also explains that the 
TSSR approach will continue to be used by the program office as the long-term 
sustainment strategy while also increasing partnership opportunities with the ALCs for 
Core workloads. 
  The Global Sustainment Partnership (GSP) team was formed by 
the SPD to develop and implement partnerships between the Boeing Company and the 
Air Logistics Centers (ALCs).  The GSP includes members from the C-17 SPO, the 
                                                 
68 ASC/YC, Flexible Sustainment Annex to the C-17 Weapon System Single Acquisition Management 
Plan, Dated January 2002. Updated Apr. 2003. 
69 Ibid 68. 
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ALCs, HQ AFMC, HQ AMC and Boeing.  The team reports progress and receives 
direction on sustainment and partnership efforts every 60 – 90 days from SAF/AQ and 
AF/IL.  The Boeing Company will perform as the TSSR contractor with direction to 
partner with the ALCs for Core workload for the long-term sustainment of the C-17 
weapon system.    
  The C-17 SPO also participates in the Public-Private Partnerships 
(PPP) in which the relationship would allow the prime contractor and the Government 
repair source (ALC) to enter into a traditional subcontract relationship if the Government 
source is determined by the prime contractor to be the best value source of repair.  Major 
goals of the PPP approach include the ability to integrate and benefit from the mutual 




This chapter provided a description of the two weapon systems: The F-16 and C-
17, and using the framework of the Sustainment Business Model, provided a descriptive 
analysis of the systems from a business community functional perspective.  This included 
a descriptive analysis of reporting mechanisms, financial management and contracting 
approaches taken by the weapon systems as described in the SPO documentation.  The 
next chapter will compare the literature review findings with the actual strategies 
undertaken by the weapon systems. 
                                                 
70 ASC/YC, Flexible Sustainment Annex to the C-17 Weapon System Single Acquisition Management 
Plan, Dated January 2002. Updated Apr. 2003. 
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IV. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF WEAPON SYSTEMS 
The previous chapter provided a general description of the two weapon systems 
and examined, using documentation provided by the SPOs, a descriptive analysis of the 
business community approach to the operation and support strategy, applying the 
structure in the sustainment business model from Chapter 2.  Taking the concepts from 
the literature review and the practical application as described in Chapter 3,  the project 
team will conduct a comparative analysis of the F-16 and C-17 sustainment strategies as 
they relate to the concepts.  For this analysis, the sustainment business model will be 
applied as a framework for comparing the sustainment approaches in following areas: 
Reporting Mechanisms, Financial Management Perspectives, and Contracting 
Perspectives. 
A. REPORTING MECHANISMS 
 
Using the findings from the literature review and the descriptive analysis section, 
this section will examine the similarities and differences in the two weapon systems that 
specifically concern Reporting Mechanisms.  The Reporting Mechanisms comparative 
analysis will examine the structure and techniques used to manage the identification and 
control of requirements in order to provide the customer with the best value weapon 
system support for the F-16 Falcon and C-17 Globemaster programs as they relate to the 
concepts previously described.   
1. Goals 
 
As the literature review revealed, any DoD sustainment program must understand 
the requirement and importance of having clear lines of authority and Integrated Product 
Teams.  In addition, programs must ensure that forums are used that foster open 
communication throughout the complicated web of the PPBE process to more effectively 
identify and control requirements in order to translate the requirements into adequate 
funding to support the warfighter’s readiness objective. Through the use of different 
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forums, the process is hopefully managed more efficiently and effectively to provide the 
customer with the best value weapon system support.   
2. Lines of Authority and Oversight Boards 
 
The literature review identified the structure and lines of authority based on public 
law and DoD/Component regulations (Table 1). Hence, both the F-16 and C-17 programs 
have near identical reporting channels.  Each program has a System Program Director 
and System Support Manager who report to respective PEOs.  Quarterly and monthly 
reports which encompass updating information, schedule and other issues on each 
program is presented to the PEO.   
As stated in the literature review, oversight boards and the forums they use, allow 
top management an overarching view on program status.  Within each program, an 
assortment of oversight boards and forums at all levels of authority is used to enhance 
communication and decision-making.  The F-16 program uses Technical Interchange 
Meetings (TIMS), a forum at the SSM level that is geographically separated from the 
SPD, to discuss detailed definitions of requirements.  The C-17 program uses the 
Requirements and Planning Council to review requirements which involves both the SPD 
and SSM.  However, not enough detailed information was provided by the SPOs to 
discussing FM personnel involvement in these forums in regards to building cost 
estimates, formulating budgets, or establishing contracts. 
Current policy and future policy uncertainty plays a large role in controlling 
requirements.  After the Defense Acquisition Board voiced concerns regarding the C-17 
Depot Support Strategy, an economic assessment was conducted.  At the time, the 
strategy was affected by several factors.  In 1996, a General Officers Steering Group was 
formed and recommended continued use of Interim Contractor Support through the 
production phase.  In 1998 the SPO implemented a Flexible Sustainment Program in 
which the AF could postpone determining the long-term sustainment strategy. Today,   
C-17 support continues under a Flexible Sustainment Concept which takes advantage of 
industry and organic support while maintaining core capabilities at the ALC.  For the      
F-16 program, performance based logistics contracts ensure partnering on core workloads 
that provided for organic support, while allocating all other workloads.  Allocation of “all 
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other” workloads is based on either government or contractor ability to meet 
requirements based on a best value determination. The use of these oversight boards and 
forums by the program offices will undoubtedly provide leadership at all levels the ability 
to enhance communication and decision-making capabilities. 
3. Integrated Product Teams 
 
As stated in the literature review, the use of IPTs is critical as they are made up of 
functional area experts, contractors and other key stakeholders.  Both programs utilize a 
variety of IPTs derived not only from personnel from applicable internal functional areas, 
but also contractors and other external agencies with a vested interest in the outcome 
(Table 1).  The F-16 SPO has utilized a variety of IPTs spanning back to the Falcon 2020 
program.  IPTs included the Hill Air Force Base Acquisition Support Team/Source 
Selection Expert Advisor coupled with the Headquarters Air Force Materiel Command 
Centralized Acquisition Support Team.  These IPTs included representatives from 
Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA) and Defense Contract Audit Agency 
(DCAA) who continue to be active participants along with representatives from the 
Deputy Under Secretary of Acquisition and a liaison from the PEO office. Currently, the 
Joint Requirements Review Team is the approving authority for adding sole-source 
requirements to the Falcon 2020 contract.  The JRRT is a standing IPT that ensures 
competition is maximized due to the sole-source nature of the Falcon 2020 contract.71  To 
determine the best long-term strategy for the C-17 program, an overarching IPT called 
the Global Sustainment Partnership which is made up of “Gatekeepers,” formed to 
provide direction on sustainment and partnering.    From information provided by the C-
17 SPO, the financial management role is not clear, but the guidance provided by this 
steering committee likely drove programmatic and budgetary decisions. 
According to the Reduction of Total Ownership Cost Best Practices Guide (Sept 
2003) the DoD created the R-TOC Program in an effort to reduce total ownership costs 
(R-TOC).  Both the F-16 and C-17 programs were chosen to pilot the new program 
among a total of 30 DoD Pilot Programs.  At the top level, the R-TOC Working Group is 
                                                 
71 ASC/YC, F-16 Global Single Acquisition Management Plan, Dated 19 September 2002. 
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made up of key OSD functional organizations, the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), and 
Service Staff.  The Working Group meets on a quarterly basis to review all program 
progress, identify and resolve issues, and coordinate activities. At the operational level, 
the F-16 Program created a Cost Reduction Integrated Product Teams (CRIPTs) that 
identify and analyze various cost drivers to identify and secure funding for Cost 
Reduction Initiatives. The C-17 program developed a multiyear procurement strategy 
which includes performance based financing and a team approach with the Government, 
the contractor, and key suppliers, all working to develop a joint cost model to identify 
cost reduction opportunities.  The Guide states that the results achieved include enhanced 
system reliability, better supply chain responsiveness, and improved logistics support.72 
Both the F-16 and C-17 Programs have made changes to IPTs in support of recent 
Acquisition Reform Initiatives.  The C-17 SPO is organized now into IPTs with a similar 
structure used by the contractor.  The IPT structure was changed after the Milestone IIIB 
decision which focused on production and support issues instead of Engineering & 
Manufacturing Development (EMD) issues.  As such, the SPO is focused on managing 
the program while reducing manpower. The C-17 SPO IPT is made up of the user, 
DCMA, contractor and SPO personnel.  The program also developed a strategy to 
contract for production, enhancement and support separately. This allowed the SPO to 
monitor actual costs and improves the ability and flexibility to support the program 
throughout its useful life.73  Since the F-16 program is more mature, it has focused its 
reform efforts on consolidating requirements into one contract vehicle.  The Falcon 2020 
IPT is made of SPO personnel from HAFB and WPAFB, representatives from the 
DCMA, DCAA, and the contractor.  The consolidated contract now incorporates both 
government and contractor defined requirements and pricing arrangements. As a result, 
the DoD now has a contract vehicle in place that meets the warfighter's needs and 
solidifies a long-term agreement between the government and contractor to support the F-
                                                 
 72 A Systems Engineering Guidebook, Office of Defense Systems, Under Secretary of Defense 
(Acquisition, Technology & Logistics), Sep. 2003.  
 73 ASC/YC, C-17 Weapon System Single Acquisition Management Plan, Dated January 2002. 
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16 program.74  The use of IPTs by program offices at the appropriate level will not only 
enhance communication and decision-making capabilities, but will also provide higher 
levels of leadership better “filtered” feedback. 
 
 
                                                 









 Lines of Authority & Oversight 
Boards 
Integrated Product Teams 
F-16 -Lines of authority are established 
IAW public law and DoD 
regulations 
 
-Technical Interchange Meetings 
(TIMS) to discuss detailed 
definitions of requirements 
 
-ROTC Working Group (made up 
of OSD functional orgs, Defense 
Logistics Agency, and Service 
Staff) used to review all program 
progress, identify and resolve 
issues, and coordinate activities on 
a quarterly basis 
-Falcon 2020 IPT (members of 
HAFB, WPAFB, DCAA, DCMA, 
contractors, DEPSECDEF/AQ) used 
to consolidate multiple contracts into 
one. 
 
-Joint Requirements Review Team 
(JRRT) is the approving authority for 
adding sole source requirements to 
Falcon 2020 contract. 
 
-Cost Reduction Integrated Product 
Team used to identify/resolve issues 
and coordinate activities (Reports 
directly to ROTC Working Group) 
C-17 -Lines of authority are established 
IAW public law and DoD 
regulations 
 
-Requirements and Planning 
Council (R&PC) to review 
requirements 
 
-General Officers Steering Group 
used to recommend Contractor 
Support until long-term strategy 
determined 
 
-ROTC Working Group (made up 
of OSD functional orgs, Defense 
Logistics Agency, and Service 
Staff) used to review all program 
progress, identify and resolve 
issues, and coordinate activities on 
a quarterly basis 
-Also uses similar IPT as CRIPT to  
identify and resolve issues and 
coordinate activities (Reports directly 
to ROTC Working Group)-Global 
Sustainment Partnership (GSP) 
provides direction on sustainment 
and partnering 
 
-Supportability Operations Review 
Team and Crew Operations Review 
Team CORT and SORT are forums 
that review and prioritize 
improvements and changes to the 
weapons system (reports to R&PC) 
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B. FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT PERSPECTIVE 
Using the findings from the literature review and the descriptive analysis of the 
weapon systems, this section will take a more in-depth look at the similarities and 
differences between theoretical concepts and practical application of these concepts.  
More specifically, the Financial Management Perspective comparative analysis will 
examine the financial related goals, decision support tools, cost estimating 
methodologies, and budget formulation and execution aspect of the F-16 Falcon and C-17 
Globemaster weapon system programs as they relate to the theoretical concepts.   
1. Goals 
 
As the literature review revealed, the most important overarching financial 
concepts to consider in a program are Reduced Total Ownership Cost (R-TOC) and Cost 
as an Independent Variable (CAIV).  Both programs are embracing the R-TOC and 
CAIV concepts to provide the customers with an affordable and/or best value weapon 
system support.  The financial decision support tools, cost estimating techniques and 
budgetary strategies all focus on achieving the affordability and best value goals. 
2. Decision Support Tools 
 
In this affordability/best value strategy, one decision support tool common to and 
preferred by both programs is the Business Case Analysis (BCA).  As stated in the 
literature review, the BCA has become a preferred decision support tool in the financial 
management community.  The BCA has long been a requirement for SORAP 
determinations, but has recently been promoted by SAF/FM as a tool of choice to support 
the decision makers in making all enterprise-wide product support decisions.  In the case 
of the F-16 program, the BCA is used for making all product support decisions, not only 
to keep costs down, but to also balance workload between public and private support 
providers.  The C-17 applied the BCA to partnership objectives.   For the partnership, the 
SPO identified the objectives as performance requirements, cost reduction, best value and 
complying with public law.  The SPO further credited the BCA with supporting Core 
workload determination, the TSSR approach and the Direct Sales arrangement. 
 68
 3. Cost Estimating Methodologies 
 
From the literature review on the subject, cost estimates are an indispensable tool 
for making trade-off decisions.  The challenging part of building a cost estimate comes in 
putting together a cost estimate which considers only the relevant costs that have a 
relationship to the operation and support function.  As for cost estimating methodologies, 
the two weapon systems pursued a number of initiatives for controlling costs making 
trade-off decisions, though the approaches are difficult to compare.  The F-16 SPO 
documentation tended to describe the cost initiatives in general terms, whereas the C-17 
SPO documentation provided a more in-depth description of cost reduction measures.  
For instance, to lower program costs, the F-16 credited the Product Support Business 
Area (PSBA) strategy, SORAP workload determinations, an ICS extension for time 
critical or unstable design requirements, and “F-16 Road Map” schedules in constructing 
POM and FYDP submissions, but did not provide details on the cost methodologies that 
were used in each area.  One of the F-16’s most recent cost savings approach was the 
Program Management Oversight of Life Cycle Support (PMOLCS) plan, a predecessor to 
the PSMP.   A Cost Reduction Integrated Product Team (CRIPT) was created to focus on 
R-TOC efforts, specifically looking at improving reliability and maintainability, reducing 
supply chain response times and competitively sourcing product support.   
As for the C-17 operation and support program, the SPO’s cost estimating 
methodology evolved from a program-wide Joint Cost Model to a more comprehensive 
and detailed cost model for the sustainment effort.  The model, called the Operation and 
Support Cost Analysis Model (OSCAM), was jointly developed by the ASC Cost 
Analysis Staff and other SPOs.  This model provided the program with a cost baseline for 
program cost estimates, budgetary trade-off decisions and contracting efforts.  A 
modification of this approach was used in costing out the Core workload.  The Core 
workload was calculated using a streamlined SORAP estimating approach which relied 
heavily on similar systems and price simulations for support equipment. 
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4. Budget Formulation and Execution 
 
As discussed in the literature review, the fiscal environment has many constraints 
and challenges.  Limited discretionary budgets and competing resources make budget 
formulation and execution a particularly uncertain process.  In response to this 
uncertainty, DOD has turned to transformational, reengineering efforts and out-of-the-
box thinking in a number of functional areas.  An effort underway in the financial 
community has been to put more emphasis on the execution phase of the PPBE process.  
This effort has involved performance-based logistics, tying financial and non-financial 
metrics to performance, and also the building of long-term relationships with support 
providers.  During the formulation and execution phase, both SPOs turned to 
performance-based initiatives and public/private partnerships to improve reliability and 
readiness.  Additionally, the C-17 SPO turned to unique funding strategies to keep 
sustainment affordable.  The F-16 Falcon used performance agreements with suppliers 
and shifted avionics upgrades to the contractor to reduce costs and improve readiness.  
The C-17 relied on a flexible sustainment contract as a means to minimize risk in depot-
related workloads.  The program’s goal under this contract performance guarantees was 
to reduce operation and support cost by using management-based reliability analysis, 
investing in productivity improvement efforts and instituting partnering arrangements 
between industry and ALCs.  For the partnering funding arrangement, the prime 
contractor, Boeing, operated under a Direct Sales Partnering Agreement with the ALCs.  
One unique funding approach used in this partnering arrangement was having Boeing, 
over a five year, period invest $62 million in capital equipment, tech data and manpower.  
In return, the C-17 SPO granted Boeing Total System Support Responsibility (TSSR).  
The TSSR contracts were separated from the EMD and Production contracts, giving a 
true picture of total support costs and adding funding flexibility to this area.  The contract 
was predominantly a firm-fixed price, which alleviated the need for cost visibility, and 




Table 2 Summary of key financial processes within the F-16 and C-17 program offices. 
 






F-16 - BCA used for 
making all product 
support decisions 
-- Goal: Keep costs 
down 
 
- PSBA strategy of 
lowering program costs; 
now using the PMOLCS 
(pre-PSMP) plan 
 
- Initiation of a CRIPT 
pilot to focus on R-TOC 
 
- Use of “F-16 Road Map” 
as basis for POM and 
FYDP submissions 
 
- ICS extension for time-
critical or unstable design 
requirements 
 
- Use SORAP for 
workload determinations 
- Use of performance-
based agreements with 
suppliers to reduce 
costs and improve 
readiness 





- Early in program used a 
Joint Cost Model; later 
turned to OSCAM to 
establish a baseline  
 
-Use of “streamlined 
SORAP” for Core 
workloads 
 
- Extended ICS to allow 
time to develop a “best 
value” support strategy  
- Use of flexible 
sustainment contract 
performance guarantees 
& reliability analysis to 
reduce O&S cost risk 
 
- Focus on productivity 
improvement efforts 
 





-- DSA and TSSR 
w/prime contractor 
 
- Boeing capital 
investment in ALCs 
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C. CONTRACTING PERSPECTIVE 
As part of the literature review process, certain procedures in regard to contract 
management were determined to be critical to the chance of having a successful support 
arrangement with the contractor.  This section will analyze the processes used by the 
program offices discussed in chapter three.  A comparison of the success actions 
discussed in the literature review will be weighed against what the program offices 
instituted as described in chapter three.  The comparison will focus on contract 
management, risk management and relations management. 
1. Contract Management 
 
A summary of the contract management literature review reveals that certain 
processes and procedures were necessary to increase the chance of a successful support 
acquisition process.  These critical success practices can be summarized as: developing 
effective incentives to encourage contractor performance, developing metrics to evaluate 
contractor performance, and developing a plan to encourage competition for future 
requirements.  An evaluation of each system program office will be completed in an 
effort to establish if these critical success practices were implemented. 
a. Development of Incentive and Metrics 
 
The development of incentives to encourage contractor performance and 
metrics to measure contractor performance are key elements in any successful contracting 
relationship.  That being said, the F-16 support contract consists of multiple pricing 
arrangements including incentive fee and award fee provisions.  Due to the twenty year 
length of the support contract however, it seems reasonable that both award fee and 
incentive fee provisions should play heavily in the structuring of the contract so as to 
prevent significant cost increases as well as to maintain a high level of contractor 
performance.  This is slightly dissimilar to the C-17 strategy in which the contract type is 
planned to be a FFP with award fee provisions tied to metrics such as the FSAA and 
customer satisfaction metric.  This plan is designed to focus on contractor performance 
throughout the relative short eight year performance period. 
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 Based on the data used in the evaluations, both weapon systems do 
adequate jobs of establishing the award/incentive fee provision appropriately to focus 
attention on cost contractor performance and/or cost savings.  Conversely however, with 
the exception of the F-16 CPAR evaluation, neither weapon system program offices 
provide evidence of consequences for contractor non-compliance nor is there any 
evidence of an exit strategy which is important given the long performance periods of 
these contracts. 
b. Development of Future Competition Opportunities 
 
 The literature review discusses the recommendation that every effort 
should be made to competitively source PBL contracts so as to facilitate a process that 
encourages price reductions.  However, due to the tremendous scope of the requirement 
and the nature of the work, both program offices awarded the sustainment contract under 
a sole source arrangement.  The F-16 SPO in particular, has an unusually long contract 
performance period of twenty three years.  This shifts the leverage of the relationship to 
the contractor so it remains essential that the program office be proactive and attentive to 
future competition opportunities and to inject procedures into the process that may 
facilitate these opportunities.  The F-16 has an arrangement is which the prime contractor 
(Lockheed Martin) participates in the DoD wide small business and disadvantaged 
business contracting program.  As such, the prime contractor’s small business goals are 
reviewed at the DoD level for compliance.  This level of governmental oversight as well 
as the use of an ID/IQ contracting vehicle, will allow greater opportunities for 
competition among small and disadvantage companies for current and future 
requirements75. 
 Although the C-17 sustainment contract length of eight years in 
considerably shorter than that of the F-16, future competition requirements still remain an 
issue in the form of the allocating core capabilities to the ALCs.  Even though Boeing has 
entered into a Direct Sales Partnering Agreement with the three ALCs for the partnering 
of core work loads (maintenance and repair tasks), Boeing still maintains significant 
                                                 
 75 ASC/YP, F-16 Multimission Fighter Program, Global Single Acquisition Management Plan 
(SAMP), Dated 2 March 1999. 
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leverage in that C-17 unique repair/maintenance tasks that are subjected to a Boeing “best 
value” determination when deciding whether the task will remain with Boeing or be 
transferred to the ALC76. 
 Again, due to the sole source characteristics of both weapon system 
support contracts, the contractor seems to have the leverage in terms of determining 
future competition opportunities.  The government, however, injects tools into the 
process that facilitate opportunities for future subcontracting opportunities. 
2. Risk Management 
 
The focus of the literature review on risk management discusses the importance of 
determining price reasonableness as well as establishing tools and processes for the early 
identification of schedule and performance risks.  The literature review goes on to discuss 
how the establishment of IPTs and the use of government support agencies such as 
DCMA and DCAA can facilitate the risk identification process. 
Both program offices have extensive risk management plans that involve the 
establishment of risk IPTs.  The F-16 program office separates itself from the C-17 with 
the establishment of the traditional government only risk IPT that identifies cost, 
schedule and performance as well as the Joint Risk Assessment in which the contractor is 
actively involved to assist in the identification of future risks.  The risk management 
approach employed by the C-17 program office employs the use of DCMA and Boeing 
contract managers and involves the use of a dual data base to manage risks.  This non-
traditional risk management approach involves weekly telecons between the government 
and contractor IPTs with monthly updates to the SPO and Boeing management. 
3. Relations Management 
 
The literature review identifies one central theme as a critical success factor 
regarding contractor relations management; the implementation of IPTs early in the 
support acquisition process.  Both weapon system program offices have multiple formal 
processes designed to increase collaboration and early involvement by the contractor as  
                                                 
 76 ASC/YC, Flexible Sustainment Annex to the C-17 Weapon System Single Acquisition Management 
Plan, Dated January 2002.  Updated Apr. 2003. 
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well as additional key stakeholders.  These processes go beyond the traditional IPTs in 
that the F-16 program office has several additional reform initiatives such as the 
previously discussed Early Strategy and Issues Session (ESIS) and the Periodic Technical 
Interchange Meetings (TIMs).  The C-17 also goes above and beyond the use of 
traditional IPTs, with the establishment of the Global Sustainment Partnership (GSP) as 
well as implementing the use of the TSSR contractual arrangement; which characterized 
itself on the collaboration by both parties.   
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This chapter revealed the manner in which the weapon systems have applied the 
concepts from the literature review in the operational environment.  Both weapon 
systems have applied many of the concepts though in some cases have taken different 
strategic approaches.  The reporting mechanisms were found to be very similar for both 
programs due in large part to the formalization of the process under PPBE.  In the 
financial management area, both programs followed the same overarching concepts in 
order to keep the programs affordable, and applied many of the same funding tools and 
strategies though to different degrees, likely due to the different maturity levels of the 
systems.  As for the contracting approach, the weapon systems followed similar processes 
and procedures to incentivize and control contractor performance, and foster competition, 
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V. GOOD PRACTICES/RECOMMENDATIONS  
As discussed in the literature review, the objective of this research project was to 
examine critical sustainment program characteristics from the business community 
perspective for applicability in future weapon system sustainment efforts.  Research was 
guided toward the identification of critical business community practices that are 
necessary to ensure the successful implementation of a long-term sustainment strategy.  
The intent of this chapter is to identify good practices incorporated by the program 
offices in their pursuit to developing more efficient processes for major weapon system 
support acquisitions.  Additionally, the researchers will identify recommendations as to 
areas of focus that may contribute to the overall success of support acquisitions for major 
weapon systems.  
It should be noted that only two weapon system program offices were included in 
this research study.  This fact prevents the researchers from concluding that the identified 
good practices developed by the respective program offices can be generalized as best 
practices for all similar support acquisitions.  The researchers do contend however, that 
the identification of good practices from the C-17 and F-16 program offices will provide 
a useful baseline of data in support of similar support acquisitions for major weapon 
systems. 
A. REPORTING MECHANISMS 
  
1. Good Practices 
 
For any process within a sustainment program, involving key stakeholders is 
critical.  SPOs must ensure involvement of these stakeholders at critical points 
throughout the processes.  During the definition of the Falcon 2020 program, the SPO 
relied heavily on key stakeholder involvement including the contractor throughout the 
finalization of the Acquisition Strategy Plan.  The Falcon 2020 SPO IPT consisted of 
members of both Hill AFB and WPAFB, representatives from DCMA and DCAA, and 
the contractor.  DCMA is an independent combat support agency within the DoD, and 
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serves as the Department's contract manager.  The importance of the SPO involving 
DCMA early-on is that they are responsible for ensuring that all Federal acquisition 
programs, supplies, and services are delivered on time, within cost, and meet 
predetermined performance parameters.77  DCAA, under the authority, direction, and 
control of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), is responsible for performing all 
contract audits for the DoD.  The importance of the SPO involving DCAA early on is that 
they are responsible for providing financial and accounting advisory services regarding 
contracts and subcontracts to all Components responsible for procurement and contract 
administration.78  It goes without saying that involvement of the contractor is vital.  After 
all, they will be accomplishing certain workloads for which DoD must explicitly 
communicate any minimal performance parameters to the contractor.  The same goes for 
involvement of the warfighter (MAJCOM).  Warfighter involvement during the 
requirements identification is critical to ensure the SPOs and other key players 
understand specifically, what the requirement is from the warfighter’s perspective.  To 
ensure this is done, logisticians must be involved as early as possible in the acquisition 
process.     
Good practices within the F-16 and C-17 program were apparent in the 
operational product support and the R-TOC initiatives.  Both programs have taken on 
certain initiatives in order to ensure improvement of system support while emphasizing 
efforts to reduce costs by involving key stakeholders within IPTs and processes. 
The F-16 SPO for instance formed the F-16 Cost Reduction Integrated Product 
Team, providing specific training in R-TOC at the operational level.  While exploring the 
potential for international collaboration to support TOC reduction initiatives for the 
overarching-program, the SPO has implemented two product support improvement 
initiatives. The first is a system of Service-Level Agreements and Government 
Performance Assessment Reports for improving supply support.  The second, Combined 
                                                 
77 DCMA website. Retrieved from http://www.dcma.mil Nov. 2005. 
78 DCAA website. Retrieved from http://www.dcaa.mil Nov. 2005. 
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Life-Time Support program, is a prototype public and private partnering strategy to 
enhance overall product support to the warfighter.79   
The C-17 SPO likewise has displayed the benefits of IPTs and early involvement 
of all stakeholders. While developing its Depot Support Strategy (DSS), the program was 
faced with strategic uncertainties as depicted in an economic analysis assessment. As a 
result the DSS General Officers Steering Group was involved in the strategic direction.  
The over-arching IPT provided vital feedback and direction for the program amidst 
policy uncertainty relating to Base Realignment and Closure, the privatization of San 
Antonio Air Logistics Center and potential legislative changes to the 50/50 work share 
rule.  The Group recommended Interim Contractor Support (ICS) continuation 
throughout production buying the program more time to determine a best value long-term 
sustainment strategy.80  In the ICS phase, the program was able to identify and fully 
understand requirements and cost estimates in the contract.  This has long-term 
implications on supportability because the SPO has cost visibility with cost-plus type 
contracts in the ICS phase.  The SPO looses that visibility once the program uses or 
converts to a Firm Fixed price contract.  Additionally, the SPO created an overarching-
IPT called the Requirements & Planning Council (R&PC) which relies on inputs from the 
operational IPTs called Supportability Operations Review Team and Crew Operations 
Review Team.  The CORT and SORT are forums that review and prioritize 
improvements and changes to the weapons system.  In the cost reduction arena, the C-17 
program developed a multiyear procurement strategy which includes performance based 
financing and a team approach with the Government, the contractor, and key suppliers, 
all working to develop a joint cost model to identify cost reduction opportunities.  The 
results achieved include enhanced system reliability, better supply chain responsiveness, 
and improved logistics support.81  
 
                                                 
79 “Pilot Programs to Reduce Total Ownership Costs,” Retrieved from 
http://ve.ida.org/rtoc/open/pilots/f16.html Nov 2005. 
80 ASC/YC.  Flexible Sustainment Annex to the C-17 Weapon System Single Acquisition Management 
Plan, Dated January 2002.  Updated Apr. 2003. 
81 A Systems Engineering Guidebook, Office of Defense Systems, Under Secretary of Defense 
(Acquisition, Technology & Logistics), Sep. 2003.  
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 2. Recommendations 
 
All SPOs face a daunting challenge in identifying and controlling requirements.  
Collaboration and communication with all stakeholders has to be clear, open and honest.   
Careful consideration should be taken when selecting IPT members not only to ensure the 
right mix of people is involved, but also to ensure people focus on solutions, not just the 
problem.  IPT members should consist of experienced personnel in their functional areas, 
but must also understand the roles of other functional areas.  Regardless of an IPT 
member’s experience, each individual must be trained in areas such as introductory IPT 
courses, functional area courses, and team dynamics.82  
Forums at all levels to promote good communication and control requirements are 
also a must.  Just as operational bases hold Financial Working Groups and Financial 
Management Boards to communicate vital FM strategies, status of funds and FINPLANS 
with key stakeholders, so too is the need and importance for the SPO and their key 
stakeholders to use forums that include key stakeholders in the business process.  Early in 
the operation and support phase, the SPOs must be especially concerned with 
communication in an EVMS IBR.  In this forum, it is important to fully understand the 
cost drivers in a contractor’s work effort and to document them for future reference.  This 
documentation will be vital later in the operation and support phase when cost visibility 
becomes limited under a firm fixed price environment.  If necessary, to keep lines of 
communication open, a program should consider extending a cost-plus contract to ensure 
the costs are fully understood and documented before pursing a firm fixed price contract. 
Now turning to the different places in which to influence the processes, using a 
model such as the Cybernetic Feedback Model discussed in Chapter 2 (refer to Figure 7), 
managers gather information and choose among the three categories (inputs, processes, 
and outputs) to determine where to devote their attention to ensure that outputs are 
matched to the overall strategy and are adequately funded. Managements’ attention needs 
to be focused on all three areas.   The research project team advocates controlling the 
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process at the inputs and process portions of the chain; clear lines of authority, well 
thought-out development and training of IPTs at the critical level, and routine forums that 
foster open, honest and trustworthy communication. Ultimately the manager, working 
under time constraints, must determine where to focus their attention.  Once outputs are 
compared to predetermined standards, accurate, reliable and timely feedback is then 
needed to alter inputs and/or processes to realign outputs with performance standards.  
Though the research project team advocates for improvement in lines of authority, 
functional specific training and communication, each program must consider unique 
aspects of their particular program that must be addressed to ensure the warfighter’s 
objectives are successfully met. 
B. FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT 
  
1. Good Practices 
 
A host of good practices were identified in the financial management area.  The 
good practices were in the area of cost estimating, budget formulation/execution and 
overarching funding strategies.   
One decision support tool effectively used by both the C-17 and F-16 was the 
Business Case Analysis (BCA).  The C-17 used BCAs early in the sustainment phase, 
and the F-16 demonstrated its usefulness throughout the sustainment process.  As a 
measure to further improve relevancy, accuracy and timeliness of financial information, 
SAF/FM has provided guidance to standardize and improve the application of BCAs to 
enterprise-wide decisions.   
One notable cost estimating tool used by the C-17 program was the application of 
an adaptive cost model called the Operation and Support Cost Analysis Model 
(OSCAM).  OSCAM was used to calculate and evaluate contractor operation and support 
cost estimates which provided a basis for trade-off decisions.  The model shows potential 
for wider applicability to other programs.  The model also employed a Data Management 
Tool (DMT) to assist the program manager and financial manager identifying and 
bounding requirements to ease the translation of the requirement into in a work 
breakdown structured cost estimate.   
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As for funding strategies, both programs leveraged capabilities of industry and 
organic providers to provide a best value approach to sustainment support.  The F-16, 
even though it is a mature program with extensive organic support, used a partnering 
strategy to reduce risk and improve performance.  In the case of the C-17, the program 
extended Interim Contractor Support (ICS) during the early sustainment phase to allow 
for time to build a better long-term sustainment strategy.  Eventually, the program settled 
on a Total System Support Responsibility (TSSR) partnering relationship with Boeing 
that included a Direct Sales arrangement with the Air Logistic Centers (ALCs) which 
included Boeing capital expenditure investments in the ALCs. 
2. Recommendations 
 
For all weapon systems, the financial management community should start 
addressing the long-term sustainment strategy as early as possible in the acquisition 
process, no later than the System Development & Demonstration phase.  All throughout 
the sustainment strategy, the financial managers must rely heavily on the logistic 
community to clearly define the requirement in order to cost out and budget for this 
requirement.  The best approach to take is to have the SPOs involve all key logistic 
stakeholders early in the process.  The key stakeholders include the prime contractor, 
ALCs, Major Commands (MAJCOMs) and a contingent of base-level end-users.  Part of 
the strategy should address the good practices mentioned in the previous section, but 
should also keep in mind statutory requirements mentioned in the literature review, a 
“best value” partnering mix between industry and organic providers, and of course, 
include the concepts of Cost as an Independent Variable (CAIV) and Reduction in Total 
Ownership Cost (R-TOC). 
C. CONTRACTING  
 
1. Good Practices 
 
This section will identify good practices as well as to issue recommendations for 
improving the support acquisition process.  That said, the good practice emerging from 
the F-16 program office is identified as the concurrent and early use of acquisition reform 
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initiatives such as the Joint Build Process and the Early Strategies and Issues Session 
(ESIS) process.  Also used is the Span Time of Acquisition Reduction (STAR) process 
for developing and finalizing proposals for task/delivery order requirements83.  The key 
to all of these processes is early contractor involvement throughout the initial stages of 
the requirements generation and contract development phases.  Additionally, these 
processes have been instrumental to the rapid identification of risks as well as the 
development of procedures to mitigate future risks.   
By using these acquisition reform initiatives concurrently and early in the support 
acquisition process, there were very few unknowns throughout the requirements 
definition and contract development stages; arguably the most critical portion of the 
process.  Early collaboration facilitated by these initiatives allowed for greater upfront 
trust from contractor and government IPTs and allowed both stakeholders to leverage 
best practices and efficient processes.   
Although not specifically identified as such, both the F-16 and C-17 program 
offices use the same general approaches, processes, and procedures characterized by the 
Alpha Acquisition concept.  Alpha Acquisition is the framework for expediting both 
goods and services in the acquisition process84 and can be defined as Alpha Contracting 
in which the government team meets with the corresponding contractor team prior to 
negotiation to consider where cost differences and technical misunderstandings exists85.  
This is easily identified by the program offices by their use of multiple IPT’s not only 
with contractor involvement but also with government support agencies such as DCAA 
and DCMA.  The common goal of Alpha Acquisition is to acquire goods and services for 
the government at a fair and reasonable price86.  That being said, the respective program 
offices use of specialized processes that involve the IPT’s (i.e. TIMs and ESIS) as well as 
                                                 
83 ALC/YP, Single Acquisition Management Plan (SAMP) for the Falcon 2020 Follow-on, F-16 
Global SAMP Annex 029 Dated 25 October, 2001. Hill AFB, Utah. 
84 Naval Air Warfare Center (4 March 2002), Alpha Acquisition Overview The Government and the 
Contractor Working Together. Retrieved from 
http://www.ntsc.navy.mil/Ressources/Library/Acqguide/alphaprt.htm Nov. 2005. 
85 Abacus Contract Management Definitions. www.abacuscm.com/glossary Oct. 2005. 
86 Naval Air Warfare Center (4 March 2002), Alpha Acquisition Overview The Government and the 
Contractor Working Together. Retrieved from 
http://www.ntsc.navy.mil/Ressources/Library/Acqguide/alphaprt.htm Nov. 2005. 
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the joint risk assessment process serve to contribute to the overall objective of obtaining 
fair and reasonable prices for the government.  Furthermore, the earlier requirements are 
defined, risks identified, and formal partnerships developed, then the greater the potential 
to obtain price reasonableness. 
As evidenced by the actions of both the C-17 and F-16 program offices, the early 
involvement by government support agencies is also a key element to Alpha Acquisition 
success.  Early involvement by DCAA personnel can result in the more immediate use of 
proposed rate recommendations as opposed to the later utilization of rates when 
significant updated changes may have occurred.  DCMA also benefits the process by 
their ability to perform one review rather than multiple reviews resulting from contractor 
proposal updates.  Additionally, the contractor also benefits by substantially reducing its 
proposal preparation costs87.   
2. Recommendations 
  
Given the long term nature of the C-17 and F-16 support contracts (8 years and 23 
years respectively), as well as the sole source nature of these contracts, significant risks to 
the government exists. This necessitates an Exit Strategy so that these associated risks 
can be mitigated.  Both of the program offices may have benefited by the establishment 
of a formal Exit Strategy in the event that the initial arrangement fails due to excessive 
costs or contractor non-compliance.  According to a GAO report, the inability to obtain 
sufficient rights to technical data could limit the long term support options by program 
offices in the event that the original arrangement fails.  The report goes on to recommend 
that program offices develop acquisition strategies that call for the delivery of sufficient 
technical data so that an alternate source can be selected if deemed necessary.   
The DoD previously required program managers to ensure access to technical 
data in previous editions of the DoD Regulation 5000.2 –R but the requirement was 
rescinded in 2002.  Beginning with the next iterations of the DoD 5000.1 and 5000.2 
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series, the DoD will require program managers to establish a management strategy that 
will again require access to the minimum data necessary to sustain the fielded system.  
For PBL arrangements, this will include acquiring the technical data needed to support an 
Exit Strategy should the primary arrangement become a non viable option due to 
excessive costs or inadequate contractor performance.88 
D. CONCLUSION 
 
The objective of this research project was to examine the critical sustainment 
program characteristics from a business community perspective for applicability in future 
weapon system sustainment efforts.  By developing a business model that focuses on the 
financial management and contracting functional communities, the researchers were able 
to provide an examination of the critical business success factors with the ultimate goal 
being the identification of the critical business community efforts that are necessary to 
ensure the successful implementation of a long-term support acquisition sustainment 
strategy. 
The increased shift toward support acquisition services has given rise to new 
tools, processes and techniques that need to be implemented in order to give the 
government and contractor the best opportunities for success.  This will involve the use 
of sound business judgments by all functional disciplines associated with the support 
acquisition process.  With the establishment and use of official policies and procedures 
that encourage jointness, collaboration, and early involvement by key stakeholders, the 
support acquisition process can evolve into becoming an efficient process in which 
substantial benefits are gained by the government and contractor. 
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